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CONSTRAINING THE FEDERAL RULES




The doctrine for deciding when to apply the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to state claims heard in federal court has become a quagmire of
exceptions and ephemeral distinctions, in large measure due to the persis-
tent difficulty courts have in separating substantive rules from procedural
ones in an era where special procedural rules are often used as an essential
regulatory tool in state governance. This article examines the power of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure to displace contrary state law in diversity
cases by focusing on the limited functional competence of the Supreme
Court and its Advisory Committee to displace state policymaking decisions
through the federal rulemaking process. It demonstrates that applying ca-
nons of statutory construction to the Rules Enabling Act that focus upon
congressional intent and the political safeguards of federalism reveals the
narrowness of the federal rulemaking power in the Enabling Act. It argues
that reading the Enabling Act through a presumption against preemption
and “clear statement” rules resonates with the core principles underlying
the modern understanding of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
This article concludes that the Court has no power under the Enabling
Act to undermine state policymaking in areas left by Congress to the states
that fall within the states’ historic police powers, regardless whether the
Rules themselves only purport to regulate procedural matters within the fed-
eral courts. In areas within the states’ police power to regulate the general
welfare, where Congress has left regulation to the states and the states have
chosen to use the litigation process itself to shape social, economic, or polit-
ical goals, the states’ policies should prevail over the Federal Rules in di-
versity cases heard in federal court, even though the manner the states have
used to effect such governance might conflict with the Federal Rules.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center. I wish to thank Berkeley Law for its support of this project during my fellow-
ship there. This article was improved by helpful comments from Eric Biber, Wayne
Brazil, Steve Bundy, Lee Epstein, Mark Gergen, David Oppenheimer, Bertrall Ross,
Bo Rutledge, Suzanna Sherry, Fred Smith, and Jan Vetter, as well as faculty partici-
pants at presentations at Drexel University–Earl Mack School of Law and the 2012
Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop at Florida International University. I am par-
ticularly grateful to John Yoo for insightful critiques of early versions of the article.
Any remaining errors are entirely my own.
187
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 2 28-MAR-13 9:50
188 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:187
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 R
I. THE HISTORICAL TENSION BETWEEN FEDERAL
PROCEDURAL UNIFORMITY AND FIDELITY TO
FEDERALISM IN DIVERSITY CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 R
A. The “Functional Irrelevance” of Erie to the
Federal Rules’ Power to Override State
Policymaking in Diversity Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 R
1. Sibbach’s Broad Interpretation of the Court’s
Rulemaking Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 R
2. The Post-Sibbach Backlash: Protecting State
Policy-Making Interests From Encroachment
by the Federal Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 R
3. Sibbach Redux: The “Functional Irrelevance”
of Erie to the Federal Rules’ Power to
Override State Policy-Making in Diversity
Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 R
B. Construing the Federal Rules to Avoid Collisions
With Important State Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 R
C. Shady Grove’s Confusion About the Relationship
Between State Policymaking and the Meaning of
the Federal Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 R
II. SCHOLARLY APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE TENSION
BETWEEN NARROW INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FEDERAL
RULES AND THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL UNIFORMITY
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 R
A. Critiques of Incorporating State Policy Interests
Into Interpretations of the Federal Rules: The Case
for National Procedural Uniformity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 R
B. Justifications for Incorporating State Policy
Interests Into Interpretations of the Federal Rules:
The Case for Conflict Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 R
III. FEDERALISM AS A BACKDROP TO PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE AND ERIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 R
A. Preemption Doctrine Against the Backdrop of
Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 R
1. The Twentieth-Century Roots of the
Federalism Canons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 R
2. The Rise of the Clear Statement Rule . . . . . . . . 231 R
B. The Connection Between Erie and the Federalism
Canons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 R
IV. APPLYING THE FEDERALISM CANONS OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION TO THE RULES ENABLING ACT . . . . . . . . 239 R
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 3 28-MAR-13 9:50
2013] CONSTRAINING THE FEDERAL RULES 189
A. Congress’s Incomplete Delegation of Rulemaking
Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 R
B. Presuming Congressional Intent to Preserve State
Law in Traditional Areas of State Regulation . . . . . 243 R
C. Proposed Alternative: Applying State Procedure in
Areas Connected to the Exercise of States’ Police
Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 R
D. Reconstructing Shady Grove Through the
Federalism Canons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 R
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 R
INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court issued its landmark opin-
ion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins in 1938,1 the Court has struggled
to articulate a coherent theory of Erie’s meaning for the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in cases involving state claims heard in federal
courts. Put simply, the Erie doctrine has evolved into a short-hand
summary requiring that federal courts apply state substantive law and
federal procedural law in diversity cases litigated in federal court.2 In
practice, separating substance from procedure has proven to be at best
complex, and at worst futile.3 While it has long been hornbook law
that valid Federal Rules generally ought to be followed even when
they displace state commands in diversity cases,4 the Supreme Court
has created an intricate patchwork of ephemeral distinctions and
murky exceptions, revealing its own deeply rooted discomfort with
such displacement of state policymaking.5
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
3. While there is no single authoritative definition of what makes a matter “sub-
stantive,” Justice Harlan’s definition is a helpful starting point. He would ask whether
“the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting
human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation.” Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also infra notes
168–174 and accompanying text. R
4. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 473–74.
5. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A Dissent
from Shady Grove, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 34 (2010) (describing the Supreme
Court as lacking “a coherent theory of when federal and state rules collide”); Bradford
R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1310 (2007) (describ-
ing the line between substance and procedure as “murky at best” and the Supreme
Court’s doctrine in this area as consisting of “seemingly contradictory approaches”)
[hereinafter Bradford Clark, Erie]; Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act
Decision That Added to the Confusion—But Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV.
1147, 1155 (2011) (arguing many of the Supreme Court’s decisions in this area in-
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Despite wrestling with aspects of this problem for nearly the en-
tire lifespan of the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court has made re-
markably little progress in developing a theoretical framework with
clearly articulated values. After three-quarters of a century, it is still
struggling to define fundamental principles that might serve as a foun-
dation for such a framework. The Court’s most recent decision in this
area, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,6 leaves the creation of such a framework in a state of abject disar-
ray. Recent cases lay bare an important disagreement within the
Court’s twenty-first century approach to federalism, which reflects a
prudential commitment to a form of judicial restraint based on a nar-
row view of the Court’s own power as it affects state policymaking.
This form of federalism leads to restrained applications of federal pro-
cedure in order to avoid displacing state law in diversity cases, even
though Congress has the constitutional power to regulate the proce-
dures used in federal courts. Moreover, this vision of federalism some-
times crosses ideological divisions on the Court, creating unusual
alliances between the justices.7
The Court’s struggle over this form of federalism ultimately is a
fight about the modern understanding of Erie’s constitutional dimen-
sion. The Court’s contemporary disagreement about whether Erie has
any relevance to the applicability of the Federal Rules in diversity
cases is symptomatic of a broad historical disagreement about whether
volve “sometimes regrettably well-disguised” balancing of state and federal interests);
Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Hanna’s Unruly Family: An Opinion for Shady Grove Ortho-
pedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 89, 90 (2010) (conclud-
ing that various Supreme Court opinions in this area are “impossible to explain” under
the reasoning of prior opinions); Jay Tidmarsh, Foreword: Erie’s Gift, 44 AKRON L.
REV. 897, 901 (2010) (observing that the Supreme Court’s opinions “have not always
appeared consistent with each other”); Ralph U. Whitten, Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.: Justice Whitten, Nagging in Part & De-
claring a Pox on All Houses, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 116, 123 (2010) (describing the
Supreme Court’s decisions as “erratic”).
6. 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437–39 (2010). The Court in Shady Grove narrowly held that
Federal Rule 23, which governs class actions, preempts a state law prohibiting plain-
tiffs from bringing class actions to recover small statutory penalties. Id. at 1441–42.
There was no majority opinion for the reasoning supporting this result. Importantly,
the Court could not form a majority as to the test for determining whether a Federal
Rule was within the scope of the Court’s rulemaking power. See id. at 1442–43
(Scalia, J., plurality); see also id. at 1449–50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
7. Compare Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419, 439, 448 (1996) (showing that Justices
Souter, Breyer, Kennedy, and O’Connor joined Justice Ginsburg’s initial articulation
of this vision of federalism, and that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas rejected it, while Justice Stevens dissented on different grounds), with Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435–36 (showing Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Breyer support-
ing Justice Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
Sotomayor, and, to some extent, Stevens preferring less deference to state interests).
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Erie has any constitutional basis.8 Over the years, many scholars have
expressed skepticism that such a basis exists at all.9 Although the
Court has come to accept that Erie has a constitutional basis, the Court
has not articulated what that precise constitutional basis is.
The Court’s many attempts to reconcile the Federal Rules with
Erie’s lessons reflects the turmoil of the Court’s concurrent commit-
ments to both federalism and procedural uniformity, values that are at
8. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946) (describing Erie’s
assertion that overruling prior doctrine was compelled by the unconstitutionality of
that prior doctrine as “dictum”); Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 595, 596–97 (2008) (arguing against the “new” and “old” myths for Erie’s con-
stitutional foundation); Arthur John Keeffe et al., Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494,
497 (1948) (describing Erie’s claimed constitutional bases as “the Achilles heel of the
opinion”); c.f. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4505 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2006) (noting that
“[f]or eighteen years after the Erie decision the Court refrained from referring again
to the Constitution in an Erie context” and “reduced [it] a few years later to a mere
‘policy’”); Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court & the Erie
Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE. L.J. 187, 204 (1957) (“On the evidence as it
now stands, the constitutional basis for the Erie doctrine is, at best unclear.”). But see
Bradford Clark, Erie, supra note 5, at 1308–11 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause R
provides Erie’s constitutional foundation); Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams,
Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 948 (1988) (“[T]he subse-
quent cases readily demonstrate that the Supreme Court has consistently treated Erie
as a decision of constitutional magnitude.”); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last
Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1682–83 (1974) (arguing Erie
reflects the Constitution’s “distinctive, independently significant limit on the authority
of the federal courts to displace state law”); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie
Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Feder-
alism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 316–17 (2008) [hereinafter Steinman, Judicial
Federalism] (arguing Erie’s “constitutional core” is that “federal judicial lawmaking
cannot override substantive rights where such lawmaking has only an adjudicative
rationale”).
9. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 8, at 278; Keeffe et al., supra note 8, at 497; Kur- R
land, supra note 8, at 204. Craig Green has forcefully attacked both the constitutional R
bases cited in the Erie opinion itself, as well as later scholarly justifications. Green,
supra note 8, at 602–22 (arguing that none of the “grounds” for the Supreme Court’s R
decision “provide[ ] adequate constitutional support for Erie’s result”). Suzanna
Sherry recently reignited this debate, arguing not only that Erie was incorrectly de-
cided, but also that it was one of the worst decisions of all time. Suzanna Sherry,
Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP.
L. REV. 129, 130–32 (2011) [hereinafter Sherry, Worst Decision] (“[O]nly Erie satis-
fies all three requirements [of being ‘the worst of all time’]: it is wrong, it cannot be
described as a product of its time, and it had—and continues to have—significant
detrimental effects.”); see also Suzanna Sherry, Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class
Actions and National Common Law, 156 PENN. L. REV. 2135, 2137 (2008) (“Erie was
probably wrong.”). But see Donald Earl Childress III, Redeeming Erie: A Response to
Suzanna Sherry, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 155, 161 (2011) (arguing even if Erie’s original
reasoning was flawed, the decision is redeemable because it has “bestowed upon us”
an “intuition” that protects “our federalism”).
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best in tension and at worst irreconcilable. The inability to harmonize
the values driving the Court’s decisions has made its doctrine unstable
and has negatively impacted the Court’s ability to offer guidance to
lower courts. The confusion has resulted in the lower courts splitting
on fundamental matters.10 This unpredictability can increase the cost
of federal litigation, create complex procedural satellite disputes that
consume significant court resources, and generally delay adjudication
of the merits of disputes. It also risks undermining important areas of
state policymaking that Congress never intended to control through
federal law.11
This article offers a new interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act
(REA) that narrows the applicability of the Federal Rules in diversity
cases where the Rules undermine certain kinds of state policymak-
ing.12 I argue that the importance of state participation in the political
processes reveals an interpretive lens through which to reconsider the
scope of the REA. This approach reframes the question of the scope of
10. See, e.g., infra note 179 (describing split in federal courts as to enforceability of R
state anti-SLAPP laws).
11. In the wake of Shady Grove, there has been a growing chorus of commentators
expressing concern over the decision’s impact upon state policymaking. See, e.g.,
Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Some Further Reflections on the
Erie Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 985 (2011)
(criticizing the Shady Grove Court for failing to “take seriously . . . the agreed bene-
fits of identifying, and then deferring to, state interests”); Borchers, supra note 5, at R
40–41 (arguing the New York law in Shady Grove was “avowedly substantive” and
the Supreme Court’s decision “charts for [litigation in federal court] a new path un-
known in New York law”); Rensberger, supra note 5, at 105 (arguing Shady Grove R
improperly “interferes with state law that has a substantive orientation while advanc-
ing no federal interest”); Whitten, supra note 5, at 132, 139 (criticizing the decision as R
reflecting “far too stingy an approach to interpreting state law” and disagreeing with
Shady Grove’s reasoning and result due to the failure to follow state law “‘bound up’
with a substantive right”); see also Helen Hershkoff, Shady Grove: Duck–Rabbits,
Clear Statements, and Federalism, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1703, 1718–19 (2011) (describ-
ing the decision’s effect as potentially “inhibit[ing] innovation by raising the costs of
[state] political action and so prevent[ing] state legislatures from treating issues that
are suppressed or ignored at the national level”); Alan Ides, The Standard for Measur-
ing the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate be-
tween Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041, 1063 (2011)
[hereinafter Ides, Standard] (observing that the plurality’s approach in Shady Grove
“undervalues a principle of federalism that arises when, in a diversity case, the
conflicting law is both state-created and substantive”); c.f. Stephen B. Burbank &
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159
PENN. L. REV. 17, 52 (2011) (“[W]e hope to have made clear the need for a moderate
and restrained interpretation of Federal Rules that otherwise would impinge on the
freedom of Congress or the States to pursue lawmaking aims that might traditionally
be characterized as substantive through means that one might traditionally character-
ize as procedural.”).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (authorizing promulgation of the Federal Rules by the
Supreme Court).
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the Court’s rulemaking power through preemption analysis, which
generally involves “an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of
state and federal law conflict.”13 The power to apply Federal Rules in
a way that intrudes on traditional areas of state autonomy should re-
quire a clear manifestation of intent by Congress to displace state law
in areas where states are exercising their historic police powers. This
article thus proposes that the scope of the REA should be interpreted
using canons of construction that safeguard federalism by presuming
that Congress does not intend to preempt the police powers of the
states.14 It uses analytic tools from legislation and preemption to shed
fresh light on the REA’s scope. This approach reveals that the modern
doctrinal framework for determining when the Federal Rules apply in
diversity cases does not adequately account for the manner in which
applying the Rules can undermine the states’ police powers in areas
Congress never occupied with federal lawmaking.
This article constructs a new framework for preempting state law
in diversity cases that carefully preserves the balance of state and fed-
eral power struck by Congress. It demonstrates that both presumptions
against preemption and “clear statement” rules (both of which require
some manifestation of congressional intent to preempt state law in ar-
eas of traditional state autonomy) are particularly useful statutory in-
terpretation tools in this context. These canons reflect values nearly
identical to ones deeply imbedded in the modern understanding of
Erie, reflecting the same theory of judicial restraint emanating from
the political safeguards of federalism located in the legislative branch.
In this analysis, the scope of the Court’s rulemaking power in the REA
turns on whether Congress intended for the Court to use the rulemak-
13. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 588 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
14. See, e.g., id. at 565 (“‘[I]n all preemption cases, and particularly in those in
which Congress has legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occu-
pied, . . . we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)
(internal citations omitted))); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (explaining that the Court
has “used a ‘presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations’”
to interpret the scope of congressional intent to invalidate state law (quoting Cipollone
v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992))); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511
U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (“To displace traditional state regulation . . . the federal statutory
purpose must be ‘clear and manifest.’” (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496
U.S. 72, 79 (1990))); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“‘[I]t is incum-
bent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’s intent before finding that
federal law overrides’” the usual constitutional balance defining federal and state
powers (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985))).
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ing power to shift the federalism balance and oust the states from gov-
erning areas within their police powers. In the absence of a clear
manifestation of such intent, if a Rule has such an effect, its applica-
tion is improper, and state practice should prevail in diversity cases.
The absence of clear direction from Congress to the Court to intrude
on areas traditionally within the states’ police powers in diversity
cases limits the scope of the Court’s own rulemaking power. The
hornbook law regarding the primacy of the Federal Rules in diversity
cases erroneously arrogates too much power to the Court to displace
state law, at least in the narrow spheres where Congress has left the
states to act as primary regulators of the general welfare, and states
choose to do so using mechanisms that are arguably procedural.
Under this new approach, federal courts should not apply a Fed-
eral Rule to displace a state’s law that is part of that state’s regulation
of the general welfare, or is otherwise related to the exercise of a
state’s police powers, in an area left by Congress to the states. The
analytic focus becomes Congress’s decision to leave states as primary
regulators in such areas. To be clear, the proposed approach does not
result in the Federal Rules failing to apply to most situations in diver-
sity cases. It does, however, require federal courts applying such Rules
to think carefully about what the Rules might be displacing.
Although conflicts between state practices and the Federal Rules
in diversity cases present problems of federal law potentially displac-
ing state law, they do not involve the “hard” form of preemption
where federal law overrides the entire operative force of the state law
being displaced. Rather they involve a “soft” form of preemption that
only displaces the state law when it is invoked in a federal forum. This
leaves the conflicting state law operational in cases being heard in the
state’s own courts and nonoperational in federal courts. In other
words, the state law is effectively nullified when it is invoked in cases
involving citizens of different states in federal court, but it continues
to have force in similar cases in state court. This article refers to this
latter form of “soft” preemption as “diversity preemption.”15 The
Court’s opinions treat diversity preemption as a form of preemption
15. The distinction between full preemption and “diversity preemption” in these
cases deserves a fuller treatment than the scope of this article permits. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to observe that both are ultimately the result of the
Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST., art. VI; see also Bradford Clark, Erie, supra note 5, R
at 1309–11 (discussing the relationship between Erie and the Supremacy Clause);
Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1639, 1655 (2008) [hereinafter Young, Preemption] (discussing the scope of federal
common law in Erie as being a problem of preemption). But see Craig Green, Erie
and Problems of Constitutional Structure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661, 665 (2008) (arguing
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operating analogously to “hard” preemption,16 thereby justifying the
use of preemption’s analytic tools in diversity cases.
This article’s use of preemption’s analytic tools in diversity cases
avoids key problems present in two streams of academic literature and
precedent, each of which emphasizes a conflicting value. The first
stream attempts to harmonize state procedure with the Federal Rules
by interpreting them to avoid conflicts, which has yielded narrow,
strained, or unpredictable interpretations of Federal Rules.17 I refer to
this as the “conflict avoidism” position.  A second, different stream
attempts to apply the Federal Rules uniformly, regardless of what state
policies they displace, which has caused the Rules to tread into poli-
cymaking decisions in areas where Congress left the states as primary
regulators.18 I refer to this second position as “procedural uniform-
ism.” The new solution offered in this article also avoids the seven-
decade-old morass of sifting substance out of procedure when the two
flow fluidly together, a task that has borne much debate but little fruit
in the Court. Most importantly, this new interpretive approach focuses
on the important political safeguards of federalism, a feature largely
missing from proposals to apply the Federal Rules broadly to further
national procedural uniformity.
This article’s argument also pushes back against an important ca-
nonical understanding about the relationship between the Erie doc-
trine and the Federal Rules. For roughly half of the lifespan of the
Erie decision, debates about the decision’s meaning have been framed
by the important contribution of John Hart Ely.19 In light of Ely’s
work, it has generally been understood that Erie offers no guidance on
the constitutional allocation of power between the states and the fed-
eral government in cases where there is some federal statute to ap-
that the Supremacy Clause concerns only the preemptive power to “‘displace’ state
law and ‘bind’ state judges”).
16. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1448, 1452–53 (2010) (discussing preemption problem) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941); accord Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965).
17. See infra Part II.A (discussing the criticisms raised by commentators of constru-
ing the Federal Rules to avoid conflicts with state law).
18. See infra Part II.A (discussing the national procedural uniformist position).
19. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693
(1974). Ely recognized that Erie arose in the context of applying the Rules of Deci-
sion Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948), a statute requiring application of state rules of
decision when there is no federal law on point, such that diversity jurisdiction only
“provide[s] an unbiased tribunal.” Id. at 713. Against this, he contrasted cases involv-
ing the Federal Rules, which turned not on an understanding of the Rules of Decision
Act at issue in Erie, but instead on the REA, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1934), in which
Congress expressly authorized the promulgation of the Federal Rules. Id. at 718–23.
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ply.20 Ely demonstrated that Erie was “functional[ly] irrelevant” to the
applicability of the Federal Rules in diversity cases,21 despite Justice
Harlan’s famous pronouncement that Erie was “one of the modern
cornerstones of our federalism.”22
In pushing back against Ely’s banishment of the Erie doctrine
from the Federal Rules, this article builds on the insight of Paul
Mishkin, who recognized that Ely’s reframing of Erie showed that
Erie’s constitutional principles reflected not only separation of powers
principles but also federalism. The latter is shown by the Constitu-
tion’s structural protection of state autonomy in entrusting lawmaking
power to Congress, where states have representation, rather than to the
courts, where states have none.23 For Mishkin, Erie was “a fulfillment
of the institutional structure of the Constitution” which requires
weighing state policy concerns in the political branches.24 Mishkin
read the REA’s delegation of the power to the Court to promulgate
federal procedural rules as “restat[ing] . . . the constitutional percep-
tion that courts are inappropriate makers of laws intruding upon the
states’ views of social policy in areas of state competence,”25 which
he viewed as fully consistent with Ely’s analysis of Erie. However,
Mishkin’s sensitivity to the structural role of state interests in the Con-
stitution helps illuminate the manner in which the modern framework
for applying the Federal Rules has become disconnected from both the
REA’s statutory grant of authority and the constitutional role of the
political branches in weighing state interests. This article considers
Mishkin’s insight regarding Erie’s reflection of the constitutional role
of the political branches as a point of departure and takes its implica-
tion significantly further than he did.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the historical in-
consistency in the Court’s deference to state policymaking in post-
Erie cases involving applications of the Federal Rules, culminating in
Shady Grove. Part II examines scholarly defenses of doctrinal ap-
proaches favoring either national procedural uniformism at the ex-
pense of state policymaking or deference to state policymaking
through conflict avoidism that results in strained interpretation of the
20. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469–70.
21. Ely, supra note 19, at 706. R
22. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. Mishkin, supra note 8, at 1683–85; see also Bradford Clark, Erie, supra note 5, R
at 1289–90 (agreeing with Mishkin’s account of Erie’s constitutional rationale). But
see Green, supra note 8, at 615 n.8, 616 (disputing Mishkin’s account as a “new R
myth”).
24. Mishkin, supra note 8, at 1685. R
25. See id. at 1686–87.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 11 28-MAR-13 9:50
2013] CONSTRAINING THE FEDERAL RULES 197
Federal Rules. I conclude that these approaches ultimately fail to ac-
count for important values or fail to solve the problem posed by state
policymaking that regulates substantive areas using procedural de-
vices. Part III defines the modern federalism principles at stake in both
preemption doctrine and Erie-related cases, then compares the evolu-
tion of those federalism principles in both the Court’s preemption
cases and its Erie-related cases. It concludes that the canons of statu-
tory construction that protect federalism are consistent with, and share
common values with, key constitutional principles associated with the
modern understanding of Erie. Part IV applies the insights of the fed-
eralism canons to the REA, argues that Shady Grove fundamentally
misconstrued the limited grant of rulemaking power contained in the
REA, and argues that Congress never delegated any power to use the
Rules to impede state policymaking in important areas of traditional
state regulation. Thus, Federal Rules should not be applied in a man-
ner that displaces this narrow category of state laws.
I.
THE HISTORICAL TENSION BETWEEN FEDERAL
PROCEDURAL UNIFORMITY AND FIDELITY TO
FEDERALISM IN DIVERSITY CASES
Many scholars have adeptly summarized the complex history of
the development of the Supreme Court’s case law in the nearly three-
quarters of a century following the Erie decision.26 This article will
not attempt to recast that full history. Instead, I focus on cases where
the Federal Rules collided with state procedures reflecting substantive
policy goals, and the Court then struggled to pin down what effect, if
any, the Erie decision had upon the applicability of the Rules. In trac-
ing this legal history, this Part offers a fresh reading of the cases by
honing in on the Court’s varying interpretative methodologies regard-
ing the scope of the Federal Rules and its intermittent deference to
federalism. Part II will then turn to the scholarly controversy that grew
out of this legal history.
26. For relatively recent examples, see Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth
of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 1004–13 (2011); C. Douglas Floyd,
Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV.
267, 271–82 (1997); Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to Be Applied in
Diversity Cases: A Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie
Doctrine and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 24–74 (1995) [hereinafter Ides, Su-
preme Court]; Steinman, Judicial Federalism, supra note 8, at 254–73. R
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A. The “Functional Irrelevance” of Erie to the Federal Rules’
Power to Override State Policymaking in Diversity Cases
The Federal Rules went into effect in 1938, the same year the
Court decided Erie. In 1938, the Court had no reason to believe that
Erie would collide with the new Federal Rules, as it presented no
procedural dispute.27 Erie involved the Rules of Decision Act and
whether to apply Pennsylvania’s doctrine regarding tort liability to an
injured trespasser in a premises liability case—a substantive question
of tort law.28 The Court chose to apply state tort law because it con-
cluded that result was constitutionally required.29
The Supreme Court first faced a collision between the newly
promulgated Rules and state law just three years later in 1941 in Sib-
bach v. Wilson.30 Sibbach unleashed a struggle to define the relation-
ship between the Federal Rules and Erie that still continues.  That
struggle reflects a commitment to federalism that has ebbed and
flowed over many decades, along with a fluid understanding of Erie’s
significance.
1. Sibbach’s Broad Interpretation of the Court’s Rulemaking
Power
In Sibbach v. Wilson, the first case to consider a collision be-
tween the Federal Rules and conflicting state procedure, the Court had
to choose between applying Federal Rule 35, which permits a physical
or mental examination of a party, and an Illinois common law rule
forbidding such examinations.31 In a 5–4 decision, the Court upheld
the application of the Federal Rule, based on its status as federal law
under the Supremacy Clause.32 It found the Rule to be within the
scope of Congress’s power to regulate the federal courts and within
27. See Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track,
49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 959–60 (1988) (“There is no evidence that Justice Brandeis
saw any significance in the coincidental unveiling of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure . . . .”); Edward Lawrence Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan—A Triple Play on
the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711, 715 (1949–1950) (“It seems that the Court
firmly believed that Erie and the Rules could live happily together in diversity cases
because of the ever-present line of demarcation between matters of substance and
matters of procedure.”); c.f. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 11, at 28 (observing that in R
that era, “federal question cases dominated the civil docket of the federal courts”).
28. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69–70, 80 (1938).
29. See id. at 77–78.
30. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
31. Id. at 7–8.
32. Id. at 16.
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the scope of Congress’s delegation of its constitutional authority to the
Court to make procedural rules governing the federal courts.33
The Court’s power to promulgate the Rules pursuant to the REA
contains two statutory limitations. The first requires that the Rules reg-
ulate “the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the
practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeal.”34
The second prohibits the Rules from abridging, enlarging or modify-
ing “substantive rights.”35
The Sibbach Court rejected the suggestion that “substantive”
rights referred to any “‘important’ or ‘substantial’” rights.36 It instead
relied on a simple binary framework that categorized Rules as “proce-
dural” when they regulate “the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”37 Rule 35’s
own subject was procedural, and that was enough to bring this discov-
ery mechanism within the scope of the REA.38 The Court viewed the
dispute in Sibbach as one over whether the Rule in question was law-
fully promulgated pursuant to the REA,39 a problem not implicating
Erie. The case merely required applying federal law that was binding
on federal courts, pursuant to the REA.40
Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented, arguing that the majority’s
substance-procedure binary failed to yield a correct answer to the
problem.41 Rather than focus on the Federal Rule’s purpose, he looked
at the purpose of the state rule that might be displaced by the Federal
Rule. He discerned a substantive purpose there, as the state’s policy of
forbidding mental and physical examinations was rooted in the “invio-
lability of the person.”42 He thus rejected the inference that a mere
authorization to make procedural rules could do away with a long-
held, historically grounded right.43
33. Id. at 9–10.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1934).
35. Id.; see also Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10.
36. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11.
37. Id. at 14.
38. The Court also treated the REA’s requirement that Congress have an opportu-
nity to review the Rules before they took effect, and Congress’s failure to stop these
particular Rules from taking effect, as signaling Congress’s view that “no transgres-
sion of legislative policy was found.” Id. at 16.
39. See id. at 10–13.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 18.
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Sibbach revealed that the conflict over applying the Federal
Rules in diversity cases depends in large measure on how one under-
stands the REA. Under the majority’s view, the REA’s authorization
to promulgate Federal Rules meant that state rules to the contrary had
to yield in a federal forum, without regard to any substantive purposes
of those state rules being displaced. Four current Supreme Court jus-
tices accept this view.44
By contrast, under Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting view in Sib-
bach, it was not enough that the Rule targeted procedure. Rather, the
application of the Rule must not trample state substantive rights.
Frankfurter’s view foreshadowed an interpretive methodology that
still animates the approach of four current justices, as well as that of
Justice Stevens prior to his retirement.45
Thus, seven decades after Sibbach, the Court remains sharply di-
vided over precisely the same issue that split the Court in 1941: the
scope of the limits Congress placed on the Court’s own rulemaking
power.
2. The Post-Sibbach Backlash: Protecting State Policy-Making
Interests from Encroachment by the Federal Rules
Two years after Sibbach, another purported conflict between the
new Federal Rules and state procedure reached the Court in Palmer v.
Hoffman,46 but with the opposite result. The parties in Palmer dis-
agreed over who had the burden of proving the plaintiff’s contributory
negligence in a railroad accident.47 The plaintiff argued that because
Federal Rule 8(c) made contributory negligence an affirmative de-
fense, it ought to be proven by the defendant like any other defense.48
44. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1442 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality) (“What matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it
governs only the manner and means by which the litigants rights are enforced, it is
valid . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); id. at 1444
(“[C]ompliance of a Federal Rule with the Enabling Act is to be assessed by consult-
ing the Rule itself, and not its effects in individual applications . . . .”).
45. See id. at 1452–53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citation and footnote omit-
ted) (arguing the plurality’s interpretation of the REA “ignores the second limitation
[in the Act] that such rules also ‘not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,’
and in so doing ignores the balance that Congress struck between uniform rules of
federal procedure and respect for a State’s construction of its own rights and reme-
dies.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)); see also id. at 1461 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(discussing the significance of the REA’s limitation on abridging, enlarging, or modi-
fying substantive rights); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 422–23
(1996) (discussing policy goals underlying New York’s procedures).
46. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
47. Id. at 116–17.
48. Id. at 117.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-MAR-13 9:50
2013] CONSTRAINING THE FEDERAL RULES 201
The Court unanimously rejected this argument. The opinion invoked
Erie and reasoned that Rule 8 on its face only speaks to the manner of
pleading the defenses, not who has the burden of proving them.49 The
opinion was silent as to why the Rule did not imply that the burden of
proving a defense would fall to the party pleading it.50 The end result
was that state law on the matter trumped the federal procedural rule’s
implication.
Palmer limited the impact of Sibbach by interpreting a Federal
Rule to avoid directly colliding with the state procedural practice. This
approach implied that if a Rule did not speak directly and unmistaka-
bly to the exact same matter as the state procedure, the conflict might
be avoided, and Sibbach’s holding regarding the Rules’ status as fed-
eral law was irrelevant.
In 1945, about a decade after Erie, in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York,51 Justice Frankfurter took one of the core ideas from his dissent
in Sibbach and made it a central feature of the Court’s re-interpreta-
tion of Erie. Guaranty Trust did not involve the Federal Rules, but its
reasoning had broad implications for the Rules. It presented the ques-
tion of whether federal courts hearing diversity cases ought to apply
the state’s statute of limitations, a matter historically considered pro-
cedural, but not covered by federal law.52 In the majority opinion, Jus-
tice Frankfurter unraveled Sibbach’s substance-procedure binary
framework, describing a Rule’s categorization as one or the other as
“immaterial.”53 He observed that the division between substance and
procedure was fluid and contextual.54 Instead of engaging in the diffi-
cult task of separating substantive and procedural rules, his opinion
directed federal courts to apply state law where necessary to ensure
“the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substan-
tially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litiga-
tion, as it would be if tried in a State court.”55 This formulation
conceived of Erie as being fundamentally concerned with equalization
of the federal and state forums for litigants in diversity cases.56
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
52. See id. at 107.
53. Id. at 109.
54. See id. at 108.
55. Id. at 109.
56. Id. at 109–10 (“The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
[sic] is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in
a federal court instead of in a State court a block away, should not lead to a substan-
tially different result. And so, putting to one side abstractions regarding ‘substance’
and ‘procedure’, we have held that in diversity cases the federal courts must follow
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Although Guaranty Trust did not involve any Federal Rule, its
reasoning served as a severe blow to Sibbach and the primacy of the
Federal Rules in diversity cases. Virtually any of the Federal Rules
could affect the result in a case.57 Indeed, Sibbach would have almost
certainly come out differently had that Court applied the test from
Guaranty Trust.58
In 1945, one might reasonably have concluded that Sibbach was
a dead letter.59 Such a conclusion would ultimately prove incorrect—
though it took several decades for that fact to reveal itself.60 Sibbach’s
vanishing influence was evident in 1949, when the Court decided an
important trilogy of cases, issued the same day, all relying on Guar-
anty Trust instead of Sibbach.61 Two of those cases involved the Fed-
eral Rules.62
the law of the State as to burden of proof, as to conflict of laws, as to contributory
negligence.”) (internal citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (setting forth the district court’s power to order
parties to appear for a pretrial scheduling conference and issue scheduling orders re-
garding discovery and trial preparation, with the possibility of case-terminating sanc-
tions against disobedient parties); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2).
58. Even in the era of Sibbach, the Federal Rules governing discovery contained a
provision permitting case-terminating sanctions for failure to comply with an order
permitting physical or mental examination. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,
8–9 (1941) (citing Rule 37(b)(2)(iii)). Thus, a district judge had the power to dismiss
a case (or strike an answer) for refusal to comply with a court-ordered examination,
making the discovery dispute “outcome determinative.” See id.
59. For example, while acknowledging that the federal court system is an indepen-
dent system of adjudication with its own “forms and mode” of litigation, Guaranty
Trust declined to allow space for federal courts to allow those variations in “forms
and mode” to justify variations in outcome where recovery would be available in one
forum but not the other. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108–09 (“When, because the
plaintiff happens to be a nonresident, such a right is enforceable in a federal as well as
in a State court, the forms and mode of enforcing the right may at times, naturally
enough, vary because the two judicial systems are not identic. But since a federal
court adjudicating a State-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of
the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State, it cannot
afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable by the State nor can it
substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State.”).
60. A few months after deciding Guaranty Trust, in 1946 the Court invoked Sib-
bach to conclude that a Federal Rule should displace a conflicting state procedural
provision where the Federal Rule at issue “relates merely to the ‘manner and the
means by which a right to recover . . . is enforced,’” without addressing variations in
outcome under Guaranty Trust. See Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,
445–46 (1946) (quoting Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109). This was the only major
decision embracing Sibbach’s reasoning for two decades.
61. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v.
Smith, 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
62. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531 & n.1 (Rule 3); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 556 (Rule 23).
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The first, Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,63 showed
the Court again engaging in the method of conflict avoidance first
seen in Palmer. A New Jersey procedural rule required a plaintiff to
post a bond not required by the Federal Rules.64 As in Palmer, since
the Federal Rule did not speak directly on such bond requirements, the
Court followed state procedure.65
That same day, the Court also chose to follow a state procedural
rule in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.66 Under Fed-
eral Rule 3, an action in federal court commences when the complaint
is filed.67 This would stop the running of the statute of limitations,
making an action timely if filed before the end of the limitations pe-
riod. Under Kansas state law, however, a limitations period would
continue running until service of the summons (regardless of the date
of the complaint’s filing). The choice of procedure mattered in Ragan
because the suit was time-barred under Kansas law but not under Rule
3.68 The Court interpreted Erie through the lens of Guaranty Trust
and found that the Kansas procedural rule governed because a federal
court “cannot give [the claim] longer life . . . than it would have had in
the state court . . . .”69
Ragan and Cohen taken together represented the high-water
mark of the Court’s deference to state procedural rules. Commentators
promptly criticized the assault on uniform, national Federal Rules.70
63. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The 6–3 majority opinion was authored by Justice Jack-
son, id. at 543–57, who was not on the Court when Sibbach was decided in January
1941. He joined the Court six months later.
64. Id. at 544–45.
65. Id. at 556–57. Nevertheless, Justice Douglas (who wrote Palmer) and Justice
Frankfurter (who defended the importance of state substantive rights in his Sibbach
dissent) both disagreed in part with the majority in Cohen, on the ground that “[t]he
New Jersey statute does not add one iota to nor subtract one iota from that cause of
action,” but rather merely regulates the method for enforcing the shareholders’ rights.
Id. at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed with the Court’s conclusion
about what the state’s purpose was.
Justice Douglas’s commitment to outcome parity between state and federal
courts in diversity cases became clear in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., another Erie-
related case decided in the trilogy that day. 337 U.S. at 535–36. Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, explained that Guaranty Trust was “premised on the theory
that . . . where in such cases one is barred from recovery in the state court, he should
likewise be barred in the federal court.” Id. at 538.
66. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
67. FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
68. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531.
69. Id. at 533–34.
70. See, e.g., Merrigan, supra note 27, at 711–12 (warning that “[p]ractising [sic] R
attorneys [were] unable to determine which of the Federal Rules will remain in full
effect and which might be rejected by the courts on the theory that they conflict in a
substantial way with some state law.”); id. at 718 (arguing that Ragan and Cohen
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 18 28-MAR-13 9:50
204 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:187
3. Sibbach Redux: The “Functional Irrelevance” of Erie to the
Federal Rules’ Power to Override State Policy-Making in
Diversity Cases
The vulnerability of the Federal Rules lasted until 1965, when the
Court decided Hanna v. Plumer and disinterred Sibbach from the
grave in which Justice Frankfurter had attempted to bury it twenty
years earlier.71 Hanna involved a Massachusetts claim in which a
driver who allegedly negligently caused an automobile accident had
died, and the plaintiff injured in the accident sued the decedent’s es-
tate and named the executor as the defendant.72 The plaintiff served
the executor in compliance with Federal Rule 4,73 but this service did
not comply with Massachusetts’s special requirement that an executor
be served personally.74 Hanna reasoned that applying state rules in
place of the Federal Rules governing the manner of service would
“disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal pro-
cedure or Congress’s attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling
Act.”75 It thus applied Federal Rule 4 over the conflicting state service
rule.76
In concluding that the federal service rule affected no substantive
rights, the Hanna Court declined to focus on whether the state rule at
issue reflected an “important” state policy.77 In a move that would
have significant repercussions in future cases, it interpreted prior in-
consistent cases as involving disputes where “the scope of the Federal
Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there
being no Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie com-
manded the enforcement of state law.”78 Pre-Hanna cases involving
the Federal Rules were thus construed as being about the scope of the
“brought uniformity in federal procedure to an end”); see also Bernard C. Gavit,
States’ Rights & Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 25–26 (1949) (noting that lawyers
in federal courts “must guess as to the proper procedure” and disputing the idea that
there is a state right to state procedure in federal courts).
71. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co., 312 U.S.1, 14 (1941)) (“The test must be whether a rule really regulates proce-
dure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them.”).
72. Id. at 461.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 462 (citing MASS. GEN. LAW, ch. 197, § 9).
75. Id. at 473–74.
76. See id. at 464. In contrast to the state rule that required that the executor be
personally served, Federal Rule 4 permitted the summons and complaint to be left
with the executor’s wife at his home. See id. at 461–62.
77. See id. at 468 n.9.
78. Id. at 470.
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Rule in question. Hanna ignored those cases’ explicit reliance on Erie
to resolve the question of that scope.
John Hart Ely’s article expounding on the Hanna decision, one of
the most influential commentaries ever written in this area of law,79
sought to dispel the “myth” that Erie “carried some special constitu-
tional magic of a sort that transcended ordinary issues of federal
power.”80 He showed that Hanna revealed the choice between a valid
Federal Rule and state procedural rule to be a straightforward statutory
application in which Erie was relegated to “functional irrelevance.”81
If a Rule falls within the REA’s grant of power, it applies by virtue of
Congress’s statutory command, and any conflicting state rule must
yield.82
Through Ely’s elucidation of Hanna, there was not one “Erie
doctrine,” but rather at least two distinct doctrines addressed to differ-
ent problems.83 The first was a pure expression of the Supremacy
Clause: where Congress has enacted legislation governing diversity
actions, the Court must follow it.84 Under this situation, the reasoning
of Hanna and Sibbach require federal courts to apply the Federal
Rules to “procedural” matters. The other doctrine is the “true” Erie
doctrine, covering matters where there is no federal statute or Federal
Rule, and the question involves a choice between a federal common
law provision and state law. In such circumstances, courts follow
Hanna’s modified version of Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determina-
tive test.85
Hanna’s legacy has been to expand the power of the Federal
Rules to subordinate state laws in diversity cases.86 This result flows
79. In early 2012, Ely’s article had been cited by seventy judicial opinions and
several hundred law review articles, according to Westlaw’s Key Cite service.
80. Ely, supra note 19, at 704–05. R
81. Id. at 706.
82. Id. at 710; see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (“When a situation is covered by
one of the Federal Rules . . . the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule,
and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress
erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the
terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.”).
83. Ely, supra note 19, at 697–98. R
84. Id. at 698; see also U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
85. Allan Ides summarizes this new test as requiring the federal court to follow
federal procedure “despite conflicting state law, unless the particular procedural rule
being challenged encouraged choice of the federal forum due to a predictable and
substantial effect that application of the rule would have upon the outcome of the
litigation.” Ides, Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 59–60; see also Ely, supra note 19, R
at 698–99.
86. See, e.g., Ides, Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 80 (arguing that the proper R
framework for determining the applicability of the Federal Rules requires first ascer-
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directly from an understanding that the validity of a Rule depends on
whether “a rule really regulates procedure.”87 Nevertheless, Hanna’s
attempt to establish a bright line with regard to the primacy of the
Federal Rules only shifted the debate to focus on the scope and mean-
ing of the Rules and required future courts to continue to interpret the
Rules to avoid such conflicts.
B. Construing the Federal Rules to Avoid Collisions With
Important State Interests
While Hanna has sometimes been lauded for providing clarity
and coherence,88 its troublesome effect became apparent in 1980 in
Walker v. Armco Steel Co.,89 which applied the conflict-avoidance
technique.90 Walker involved the lapsing of a state statute of limita-
tions for a state negligence claim where the plaintiff had filed suit in
federal court within the statute of limitations period, but had not
served the defendant in a timely manner.91 Instead of applying
Hanna’s new “bright line” rule by enforcing Rule 3’s definition of
when an action commences in federal court,92 the Court instead re-
treated to pre-Hanna rationales for applying state law.93 Walker held
there was no direct collision between Rule 3 and the Oklahoma stat-
ute, even though both explicitly set different triggers for when an ac-
tion commenced.94 The Court looked to the state’s policy rationale
taining whether the rule covers the circumstances at hand and then inquiring whether
the Rule is valid under the REA, with the understanding that “rules promulgated pur-
suant to the REA must, at least arguably, regulate the manner, method or means
through which a case is litigated.”)
87. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); see also Ely, supra note 19, at R
719–20. This approach has been criticized for ignoring the second sentence of the
REA’s limitation on the Rules, namely that they may not abridge, enlarge, or modify
any substantive right. See Ely, supra note 19, at 723–24. However, others have ar- R
gued there is a “strong presumption of validity” for the Federal Rules. See Ides, Su-
preme Court, supra note 26, at 80–81. R
88. See 19 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, at § 4505 (describing R
Hanna’s analytic framework as “coherent”); Ides, Supreme Court, supra note 26, at R
56 (describing Hanna as “provid[ing] a coherent method for assessing the legitimacy
of” the Rules). But see Ides, Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 59 (suggesting that the
Court’s failure to overrule Ragan, Woods, and Cohen “comes with the price of pro-
moting unnecessary ambiguity”).
89. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
90. Id. at 750–52.
91. Id. at 742–43. Under Oklahoma law, just as in Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), the statute of limitations was not tolled by the
filing of the complaint because the action was not “deemed commenced” until service
of the summons. Id.
92. Id. at 747.
93. Id. at 752–53.
94. Id. at 751–52.
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and found a “substantive decision” favoring actual service on a defen-
dant to serve the purpose of the statute of limitations.95
Hanna did nothing to dissuade the Court from inquiring into the
purpose served by state procedures in order to ascertain whether they
cover the same matter as a Federal Rule in Walker.96 Thus, even after
Hanna, the Court continued to account for federalism concerns by ex-
amining the state policy purpose underlying the law being displaced,97
and by using creative interpretive approaches to avoid applying partic-
ular Rules.98 Nevertheless, the Walker opinion remarked somewhat
ironically in a footnote that this application should not “suggest that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in
order to avoid a ‘direct collision’ with state law. The Federal Rules
should be given their plain meaning.”99 Surprisingly, the Court subse-
quently interpreted Rule 3 to have a different “plain” meaning in a
federal question case than it had in diversity cases like Ragan and
Walker, where there was a state law governing the same point.100 It
thus becomes impossible to account for Walker’s result using the text
of Rule 3 alone.
The focus on state policymaking goals returned again in 1996 in
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.101 In Gasperini, New York
law required state court judges to award a new trial when a jury’s
award “deviate[d] materially from what would be reasonable compen-
95. Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie after Gasperini, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1637, 1641–42 & n.12 (1998) [hereinafter Freer, Gasperini].
96. Even decisions in this era applying the Federal Rules over state laws continued
to examine the state’s purpose in enacting those laws to illuminate whether there was
an actual conflict between the state law and Federal Rule. See Burlington N. R.R. v.
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 & n.5 (1980) (finding the two potential sources of law in con-
flict, based in part on its reading of the purpose of the conflicting state procedure,
which served the same goal as the Federal Rule).
97. See Clermont, supra note 26, at 1028–29 (“Federal judges have demonstrated R
an inclination, perhaps motivated by the irrepressible myth of Erie, to find some way
to accommodate state interests.”); Richard Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, The Irrepressi-
ble Influence of Byrd, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 61, 68–77 (2010) (arguing the Court
implicitly balances state interests as part of a silent, behind-the-scenes application of
the balancing test in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958)).
98. See discussion infra notes 102–115 and accompanying text (regarding R
Gasperini).
99. See Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980).
100. See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 & n.4 (1987). West’s use of a different
“plain meaning” for Rule 3 in a federal question case than in diversity cases was
criticized by one commentator as a “sleight of hand.” Stephen P. Burbank, Of Rules
and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 693, 702 (1988).
101. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
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sation.”102 This state law purportedly contravened the Seventh
Amendment’s prohibition on re-examining facts tried by a jury,103 as
well as the federal common law practice of permitting district judges
to review verdicts only to determine whether the amount awarded by
the jury “shocked the conscience,” and then having their findings re-
viewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion.104 It also created a po-
tential conflict with Federal Rule 59(a), which allowed district judges
to grant a new trial “for any of the reasons for which new trials have
heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United
States.”105
As in Walker, the Court examined the state legislature’s rationale
for passing the state law.106 The federal “shocks the conscience” stan-
dard could have potentially allowed federal juries to award sums that
did not shock the conscience, but still deviated materially from reason-
able compensation by grossly exceeding the amount of awards in sim-
ilar cases. Thus, as New York was attempting to limit how much state
plaintiffs could recover on state-created claims, the Court concluded
that the procedural rule had a substantive purpose.107
Confining its analysis to a cryptic footnote, the Court concluded
that Rule 59(a) did not directly collide with the New York procedure
because the Rule itself lacked any standard for determining new trial
motions.108 Absent any federal law to supply that standard, it found
the only candidate to be state law.109 It also hinted that any other con-
clusion might cause Rule 59(a) to violate the REA by abridging, en-
larging, or modifying a substantive right.110 In analyzing Rule 59(a),
102. Id. at 418 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (MCKINNEY 1995)).
103. See id. at 419 (“The compatibility of [N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) and the Seventh
Amendment] . . . is the issue we confront in this case.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
VII (“[T]he right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.”).
104. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 422 (“[C]ourts would not disturb an award unless the
amount was so exorbitant that it ‘shocked the conscience of the court.’”).
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a) (1997); see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 467–68 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the principle behind application of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c),
rather than FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a), in this case “bears the potential to destroy the uni-
formity of federal practice and the integrity of the federal court system”).
106. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 429.
107. Id. (“In sum, § 5501(c) contains a procedural instruction . . . but the State’s
objective is manifestly substantive.”).
108. Id. at 437 n.22.
109. Id. (“Whether damages are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be governed by
some law. And there is no candidate for that governance other than the law that gives
rise to the claim for relief—here, the law of New York.”).
110. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a)–(b)) (“Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of . . . procedure”; “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
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the Court invoked Walker as standing for the proposition that the
Court should “‘interpret the federal rules to avoid conflict with impor-
tant state regulatory policies.’”111 The Gasperini majority used the
state policy rationale not just to determine the breadth of the New
York law, but also to guide its interpretation of the federal procedural
rules themselves,112 thereby avoiding Hanna’s rule.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, rejected the majority’s conclusion that the New York law
was substantive.113 He thought it was a mistake to reach the Erie anal-
ysis at all because Hanna required the Court to follow the Federal
Rule.114 Without explaining why Rule 59(a) covered the same situa-
tion addressed by the state rule, or addressing the use of the state pol-
icy rationale as an interpretive lens in prior case law, Scalia concluded
that the Federal Rule controlled.115
Gasperini met with mixed reviews from academic commentators.
One commentator lauded the efficacy of the Court’s “remarkably sta-
ble” framework by pointing out that the Court was at least able to
render an opinion for a clear majority in every leading Erie-related
case.116 By contrast, other scholars read Gasperini as having the po-
modify any substantive right”). The Court found a substantive right in the New York
standard for determining a new trial, because that standard was analogous to a limit on
damages, which the Court surmised would be substantive. Id. at 440, 441 n.1 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (endorsing the majority’s reasoning but disagreeing on the dispo-
sition of the case).
111. Id. at 437 n.22 (quoting R. FALLON, D. MELTZER, & D. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 729–30 (4th ed. 1996)).
112. This approach echoed the one proposed by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Stew-
art Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37–38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]n
deciding whether a federal procedural statute or Rule of Procedure encompasses a
particular issue, a broad reading that would create significant disuniformity between
state and federal courts should be avoided if the text permits.”). However, Justice
Scalia apparently no longer held this view by the time the Court decided Gasperini.
113. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 464 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It seems to me quite wrong
to regard this provision as a ‘substantive’ rule for Erie purposes.”).
114. Id. at 467–68 (“[T]he court has no choice but to apply the Federal Rule, which
is an exercise of what we have called Congress’s ‘power to regulate matters which,
though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are ration-
ally capable of classification as either.’” (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472
(1965))).
115. Id. at 468. Though Scalia had earlier read Walker, Cohen, and Palmer as re-
quiring statutory interpretations facilitating avoidance of conflict with state law, Stew-
art, 487 U.S. at 37–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting), he saw no possibility of applying such
an interpretation here. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 468.
116. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think
the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 1014–15 (1998). Any purported stability of the doctrine
surely collapsed in the fractured opinion in Shady Grove. See infra Part I.C (discuss-
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tential to lead to “unwarranted subordination of substantive state
objectives to ad hoc judicial perceptions of amorphous federal proce-
dural ‘interests,’”117 as “cast[ing] Erie adrift from its constitutional
moorings” by disregarding Hanna,118 and as “turn[ing] the Erie Doc-
trine on its head by creating ‘a transcendental body of law outside of
any particular State but obligatory within it.’”119
The disagreement over Gasperini’s reading of Rule 59(a) was a
prelude to the fractured decision in Shady Grove.
C. Shady Grove’s Confusion About the Relationship Between State
Policymaking and the Meaning of the Federal Rules
In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,120 the Court finally confronted six decades of inconsistency in its
interpretations of the scope of the Federal Rules. Its attempt to resolve
this inconsistency failed abysmally. There was no majority opinion for
significant aspects of Shady Grove’s rationale, and a majority of the
justices disagreed on most of it.121
Shady Grove involved an alleged conflict between the federal
class certification requirements set forth in Rule 23122 and a New
York statute prohibiting plaintiffs from bringing class actions to re-
cover small statutory penalties to avoid allowing these small penalties
to create “annihilating punishment” for defendants.123 When an insur-
ing the failure of the Supreme Court to resolve inconsistency understanding the scope
of the Federal Rules).
117. Floyd, supra note 26, at 269–70. R
118. Michael A. Berch & Rebecca White Berch, An Essay Regarding Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc. and the Demise of the Uniform Application of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 MISS. L.J. 715, 733–34 (1999).
119. Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An
Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 707
(2006) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)). In this vein,
another scholar described Gasperini as “misbegotten precedent” and its reasoning as
“unfathomable.” John B. Oakley, Illuminating Shady Grove: A General Approach to
Resolving Erie Problems, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 79, 79, 88 (2010) [hereinafter
Oakley, Shady Grove].
120. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
121. See id. at 1442 (Part II.B, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and
Sotomayor); id. at 1444 (Part II.C, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas);
id. at 1451 n.5, 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing with four dissenting justices’
analytic approach but disagreeing on its application to the facts).
122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
123. 130 S.Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Vincent Alexander, Prac-
tice Commentaries, C901:11, reprinted in 7B MCKINNEY’S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF
NEW YORK ANNOTATED 104 (2006)); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (MCKINNEY
2006); Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438 (“The Second Circuit believed that § 901(b)
and Rule 23 do not conflict because they address different issues . . . . We Disagree.”).
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ance carrier owed a total of approximately $500 in such penalties to
one set of doctors due to delays in remitting payment for claims, the
doctors brought a $5 million class action in federal court under the
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), invoking diversity jurisdiction.
The plaintiff doctors invoked Rule 23 to evade New York’s prohibi-
tion on class treatment for such claims.124
Following Hanna, a majority of five justices agreed that the class
action could be maintained in federal court because Rule 23, not New
York law, controlled the requirements for certifying a class.125 The
majority held that the state’s legislative purpose “cannot override the
[state] statute’s clear text” when that text collides with a Federal Rule,
and there is “only one reasonable reading” of that Rule.126 As in
Hanna, Shady Grove distinguished prior cases that used strained inter-
pretations of Rules to avoid conflicts with state policymaking as
somehow involving Rules not covering the same subject as state laws
that used almost exactly the same words.127
Four dissenters and Justice Stevens, who concurred with the ma-
jority as to the result, embraced the principle that the Federal Rules
“must be interpreted with some degree of ‘sensitivity to important
state interests and regulatory policies.’”128 This faction failed to form
a majority, though, as the justices disagreed on how this vague princi-
ple should be applied to the facts. Nevertheless, the common ground
they shared included some interpretive space in the Federal Rules to
weigh federalism concerns in deciding the scope of any particular
Rule. Given the majority’s holding, however, this interpretative space
now exists only where a Rule is susceptible to more than one “reason-
able reading,” and the Rule’s plain text does not collide with the text
of the state rule (as distinguished from the state’s policy goals in en-
acting that rule).
124. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; see id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“By . . . filing in federal court based . . . [on] diverse citizenship and requesting class
certification, Shady Grove hopes to recover, for the class, statutory damages of more
than $5,000,000. The New York Legislature has barred this remedy . . . .”).
125. Id. at 1438.
126. Id. at 1440; see also id. at 1441 n.7.
127. See id. at 1441–42 (“If the Rule were susceptible of two meanings—one that
would violate § 2072(b) and another that would not—we would agree. . . . But it is
not. Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes any plaintiff, in any federal civil proceeding,
to maintain a class action if the Rule’s prerequisites are met. We cannot contort its
text, even to avert a collision with state law that might render it invalid.”).
128. Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)); see also id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I
would continue to interpret Federal Rules with awareness of, and sensitivity to, impor-
tant state regulatory policies.”).
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In the face of the apparent textual conflict between Rule 23 and
the New York law, Justice Scalia, writing for a four-justice plurality,
declined to delve into the state’s “subjective intentions” and refused to
invite a situation where “one State’s statute could survive [diversity]
pre-emption (and accordingly affect the procedures in federal court)
while another State’s identical law would not, merely because its au-
thors had different aspirations.”129
At least five justices rejected this aspect of the plurality’s ap-
proach. Justice Ginsburg, writing for three other dissenting colleagues,
emphasized the Court’s long history of reading the Rules to avoid con-
flicts with state laws, both before and after Hanna.130 She perceived
the New York Legislature’s intent to prevent the exorbitant inflation
of penalties in class actions.131 She viewed Rule 23 as being suscepti-
ble to an interpretation that would avoid conflicting with this state
policy goal, as Rule 23 does not speak to the kind of remedy available
to a party bringing a class action.132 A plaintiff might seek some other
remedy in a representative suit, but not the statutory penalty provided
by New York law. Thus, Justice Ginsburg would have held the case
was like Gasperini and followed the state law.133
The concurrence authored by Justice Stevens shared much of the
dissent’s analytic framework, but disagreed with the dissent’s applica-
tion of that framework to the facts of the case, and agreed with Justice
Scalia that there was only one reasonable way to read Rule 23.134 Jus-
tice Stevens parted ways with the dissenters in their understanding of
the intent of the New York Legislature as targeting something differ-
ent from Rule 23. He suggested such a finding was impossible where
the state procedural law at issue was so generic as to apply not only to
New York’s own statutory penalties, but also to penalties under other
states’ laws, and where there was inadequate legislative history to
show a substantive purpose.135 For Justice Stevens, there was a failure
of proof as to any substantive policy goals behind the New York stat-
ute at issue.136 He thus agreed with Justice Ginsberg’s general sensi-
tivity to state policy goals, but he interpreted the specific goals in play
in this case differently.
129. Id. at 1441 (Scalia, J., plurality).
130. Id. at 1462–63 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1464.
132. Id. at 1465–66.
133. Id. at 1472.
134. Id. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. See id. at 1457.
136. See id. at 1458.
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In addition to fracturing over the role of state legislative intent in
the analysis, the Court also split over conflicting understandings about
the scope of the REA’s rulemaking power. Justice Scalia argued on
behalf of a plurality that, in accordance with Sibbach, a Rule is valid
under the REA so long as it “governs only the manner and the means”
by which litigants’ rights are enforced, regardless of whether it affects
substantive state rights.137 In this schema, “compliance of a Federal
Rule with the Enabling Act is to be assessed by consulting the Rule
itself, and not its effects in individual applications.”138 Writing for an
even smaller plurality, Justice Scalia would have extended Sibbach to
effectively overrule Gasperini, and hold that even state procedures
that are bound up with substantive rights can be displaced by Federal
Rules.139
Justice Stevens again rejected this smaller plurality’s position and
instead recognized that Congress has not exercised its own power to
“prescribe procedural rules that interfere with state substantive law in
any number of respects.”140 Rather, he would interpret the REA to
mean that the Federal Rules “cannot displace a State’s definition of its
own rights or remedies.”141 Like the four dissenters, Justice Stevens
embraced Gasperini’s instruction that courts should interpret federal
rules “with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory poli-
cies.”142 Somewhat implausibly, he also signed on to the majority
opinion’s castigation of that very inquiry as “standardless” in a foot-
note in Part II.A of the majority opinion.143
Justice Stevens recognized the connection of the Rules to a con-
gressional policy choice related to federalism. He concluded that the
interpretation of the Federal Rules takes place against the background
of a balance struck by Congress that focuses on the state law being
displaced. In this balance, the form of the state law does not matter; it
instead “turns on whether the state law actually is part of a State’s
137. Id. at 1442.
138. Id. at 1444.
139. Id. at 1445–46 & n.13.
140. Id. at 1449.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 1449 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427
n.7 (1996)).
143. Id. at 1441 n.7 (majority opinion). In this important footnote, the majority criti-
cized Gasperini’s purported mandate to interpret the Federal Rules “with sensitivity
to important state interests” and “to avoid conflict with important state regulatory
policies” as “standardless,” except where that practice is merely an attempt to inter-
pret an ambiguous Rule in a way that “avoid[s] substantial variations [in outcomes]
between state and federal litigation.” Id (internal quotations omitted).
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framework of substantive rights or remedies.”144 In such a framework,
a procedural rule “may exist ‘to influence substantive outcomes.’”145
As Congress has not told states what form their substantive laws must
take, state legislatures may regulate substantive matters in whatever
way they see fit, including by using procedural devices.146
In answering whether a Rule is valid under the REA, Justice Ste-
vens would have applied a “federalism presumption” that a Rule will
not preempt state law unless that was “the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.”147 If the Rule appears to overstep the REA’s limitation
on modifying, abridging, or limiting substantive rights, the Court
should interpret the Rule to avoid the problem if it can reasonably be
so interpreted.148 If such an interpretation is not possible, the Court
cannot apply the Federal Rule to the state law at issue.149 In this re-
gard, Justice Stevens sought to avoid the need to declare whether the
Rule is facially invalid, and focused only on whether it might be inva-
lid as applied to a particular state’s law.150 Justice Stevens thus would
not have looked solely to whether the Federal Rule regulates proce-
dure, but would also have considered how it interacts with state law in
conformity with the “federalism presumption.”151
II.
SCHOLARLY APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE TENSION
BETWEEN NARROW INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
FEDERAL RULES AND THE NEED FOR
PROCEDURAL UNIFORMITY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Court’s historical uncertainty about interpreting the Federal
Rules in the face of potential conflicts with state rules has given rise to
two prominent lines of scholarship, each advocating for particular val-
ues emphasized in the precedent. Following Ely’s pathmaking work,
144. Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 1450 (quoting S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60
F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995)).
146. Id.
147. See id. at 1451, 1453 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. at 1452.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 1452 (“[W]hen such a saving construction is not possible and the rule
would violate the Enabling Act, federal courts cannot apply the rule.”). This is in
some tension with the majority’s observation that considering the subjective intent
behind a state law would impermissibly open the door to allowing one state’s law to
survive preemption by a Federal Rule, but an identical law to yield to the Rule. See id.
(majority opinion) at 1440–41.
151. See id. at 1453 (Stevens, J., concurring).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 29 28-MAR-13 9:50
2013] CONSTRAINING THE FEDERAL RULES 215
many scholars who have examined the problem have concluded that
Erie offers no guidance on the applicability of the Rules in diversity
cases. The scholarship emanating from this conclusion generally fo-
cuses on the importance of procedural uniformity throughout the fed-
eral courts and concludes that the Rules should trump state procedure
to the contrary. This position is deeply rooted in the logic of Sibbach
and Hanna. Against this, there is a second stream of scholarly criti-
cism that emphasizes the importance of federalism to Erie. It argues
that conflicts between the Rules and state procedure sometimes ought
to be avoided, based on Erie’s core values, in order to leave room for
state policymaking. This position resonates with Palmer, Ragan,
Walker, and Gasperini. This Part will argue that while both streams of
scholarship make important contributions, both ultimately fail to ac-
count fully for important values underlying the modern understanding
of Erie.
A. Critiques of Incorporating State Policy Interests Into
Interpretations of the Federal Rules: The Case for
National Procedural Uniformity
Long before Shady Grove, the Court’s practice of using interpre-
tive techniques to avoid conflicts between the Federal Rules and state
procedures was subject to scholarly critique focused on the need for
uniform, predictable application of the Federal Rules.152 Flexible in-
terpretations of the Rules cause their meaning to shift haphazardly,
according to the circumstances in which they are applied and the par-
ticular state interests at stake in each case. This haphazard shifting
yields unpredictable Rules without fixed meanings. Commentators
emphasized the importance and utility of uniform procedural rules in
152. See, e.g., Merrigan, supra note 27, at 711–12 (warning that “[p]ractising [sic] R
attorneys [were] unable to determine which of the Federal Rules will remain in full
effect, and which might be rejected by the courts on the theory that they conflict in a
substantial way with some state law”); id. at 718 & n.32 (arguing that Ragan and
Cohen “brought uniformity in federal procedure to an end”); see also Berch & Berch,
supra note 118, at 747 (criticizing Gasperini’s “grudging[ ]” interpretation of Rule R
59(a) as threatening the uniform application of the Federal Rules); Dudley & Ruther-
glen, supra note 119, at 708 & n.7 (describing “a chorus of academic criticism”); R
Bernard C. Gavit, States’ Rights & Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 25–26 (1949)
(noting that lawyers in federal courts “must guess as to the proper procedure” and
disputing the idea that there is a state right to state procedure in federal courts); c.f.
Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1169 (2002) (arguing that the Court should
be constrained to interpret the Federal Rules according to the text and the meaning
suggested by the Rules Advisory Committee that drafted them).
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federal courts.153 This article denominates this general approach to in-
terpreting and applying the Rules as “procedural uniformism.”
The Shady Grove plurality’s attempted return to strict, textual
analysis reflects this uniformist view of the Federal Rules. The
uniformist critique takes various forms, some more flexible than
others, but its principle contribution is to illuminate that the Rules cre-
ate a single, national system of procedure in the federal courts, as an
independent system of adjudication. Such a national system provides
predictability and coherence, along with ease of administration. Effec-
tive procedural rules should be capable of being applied efficiently to
move cases to resolution on their merits. National procedural uniform-
ity thus has significant practical benefits.154
The uniformist approach generally argues that the Federal Rules
should be interpreted based primarily on the Rules’ plain text.155
However, some scholars have suggested that this plain text should be
supplemented with interpretive information that can help reveal the
Rules’ objective meaning, without resorting to contextual reliance on
state interests to interpret the Rules. For example, one proposal would
look at the manner in which the history of a procedural device, such as
class actions, affected the drafting of the Federal Rule.156 Another
would start with the text of the Rule, then evaluate four additional
factors, including (1) the interpretation that will best achieve the Advi-
sory Committee’s purpose in promulgating the Rule,157 (2) the policy
153. See, e.g., Burbank & Wolff, supra note 11, at 45 (rejecting “particularistic and R
after-the-fact analysis of the policies underlying state law prescriptions on the very
matter that the Federal Rule cover[s]” because such an approach “is hardly consistent
with the vision of uniform and simple Federal Rules”); Oakley, Shady Grove, supra
note 119, at 88 (agreeing with Justice Scalia that assessing the substantive or procedu- R
ral character of state rules to assess their validity against Federal Rules would be
“destabilizing”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-En-
hancing Benefits of Erie Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 977 (2011) (arguing
“against federal courts being too skittish about applying federal procedure merely be-
cause of its potential for differences with state court outcomes”). But see Whitten,
supra note 5, at 130. R
154. For example, Earl Dudley and George Rutherglen argued that narrow interpre-
tations of the Rules “to avoid a conflict with state law ha[ve] the deleterious conse-
quence of making the [R]ules themselves a disconcertingly unreliable guide to what
federal procedure actually is.” Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 119, at 737. They R
characterized this history as reflecting “schizophrenic interpretation” of the Rules in
which the Rules are usually followed but are “distorted beyond all recognition in a
few cases in which they are thought potentially to conflict with state law.” Id. at 740.
155. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1440 (2010).
156. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 11, at 53–63. R
157. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules considers suggestions to amend the
Federal Rules, drafts proposed Rule amendments, authorizes the drafting of explana-
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interests the Rule was designed to and should currently further, (3)
whether interpreting the Rule can be deferred to case-by-case correc-
tion, and (4) how the Rule fits into the entire Federal Rules struc-
ture.158 A third approach focuses on the text of the Rules with
reference to the views of the Advisory Committee as an interpretive
guide.159
These suggestions for extra-textual interpretation vary in the tex-
tual supplements they consider, but they generally reject using state
interests as a trigger to interpret the Rules narrowly. While more so-
phisticated than the Shady Grove plurality’s rigid textualist approach
to the Rules, these forms of uniformism would potentially require the
district courts to engage in a difficult analysis to interpret the Rules.
This could potentially eviscerate the efficiency benefits that are ulti-
mately the justification for procedural uniformism.
The proponents of the various theories favoring text-based inter-
pretation of the Rules (or text-based interpretation supplemented by
other references) generally agree that the Supreme Court would be
better off invalidating a Rule that impinges on state substantive areas
under the REA rather than avoiding the problem through narrow inter-
pretation.160 Nevertheless, procedural uniformism seems to require
that the Court not actually take up this academic invitation and ever
invalidate any Rule. As of 2012, the Supreme Court has yet to invali-
date a Federal Rule—but if it ever does so, lower courts would poten-
tially be tempted to follow the Court’s lead and begin invalidating
other Rules. Given the few cases heard by the Supreme Court each
year, once the Court gives its imprimatur to striking down Rules as
beyond the scope of the REA, the task would be taken up by the dis-
trict and circuit judges (with the Supreme Court engaging in infre-
quent review, perhaps once a decade or so). As a practical matter, the
goal of procedural uniformity in federal courts then would likely be
tory notes, and ultimately submits these proposals to the Standing Committee, which
may forward them to the Judicial Conference. Upon approval by the Judicial Confer-
ence, the proposals are transmitted to the Supreme Court, which may submit both the
Rule amendment and explanatory note to Congress, which has an effective veto on a
Rule’s codification. See Struve, supra note 152, at 1103–04 (explaining the Rule- R
making process).
158. Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1096 (1993).
159. See generally Struve, supra note 152. R
160. For example, one commentator has argued that where a Rule potentially vio-
lates the REA, the Court should not “rewrite a Rule” to avoid the REA problem by
departing from the Rule’s text and the Advisory Committee’s notes. Struve, supra
note 152, at 1151. R
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undermined by the practical dispersion of decision-making to many
different circuits, with the risk of circuit splits developing.
Though criticized by procedural uniformists, the Court’s use of
narrow interpretations of the Rules to avoid the question of a Rule’s
validity so far has served as a signal to the lower courts not to take aim
at the validity of particular Rules. The absence of such avoidance
could create new incentives to venue-shop within the federal system in
diversity cases in order to take advantage of circuit splits as to the
validity of particular Rules. For example, at least six circuits have held
that a district judge should apply the interpretation of federal law
handed down by the circuit in which she sits, even if the case was
transferred from a district in a circuit with a conflicting interpretation
of federal law.161 In transferred cases, interpreting the validity of a
particular Federal Rule under the REA would likely be governed by
the circuit precedent in which the transferee district is located. This
would give parties powerful incentives to seek to transfer cases to ve-
nues where there might be advantageous case law regarding the en-
forceability of a Federal Rule. Such venue shopping would be a new
twist, fraught with special problems, on the old concern dating back to
Erie about unfair results in diversity cases due to forum shopping.162
Thus, while there is much to commend commentators’ sugges-
tions to strike down Federal Rules as outside the scope of the REA
rather than engage in strained readings of Rules to avoid conflicts,163
doing so would not necessarily advance the goal of national procedu-
ral uniformity. It has the potential to do quite the opposite, due to the
risk of circuit splits on hard questions involving the Rules’ validity.
Nevertheless, these commentators are correct in concluding that
the Court should examine the plain meaning of the Rules to determine
whether they conflict with state law in a way that might violate the
161. See, e.g., McMasters v. United States, 260 F.3d 814, 819–20 (7th Cir. 2001);
Murphy v. FDIC, 208 F.3d 959, 965–66 (11th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Murphy v.
Beck, 530 U.S. 1306 (2000), cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 1107 (2001); Campos v. Tick-
etmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1171 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998); Newton v. Thomason, 22
F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 1994); Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40–41 (2d Cir.
1993); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174–75
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.). These courts have distinguished this rule from
cases involving different, conflicting state laws, where the Supreme Court has held
the law of the transferring jurisdiction controls. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.
612, 638–39 (1964); see also infra Parts III.A and III.B.
162. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–77 (1938); see also Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (“The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that
it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ because
the suit had been brought in a federal court.”).
163. See infra Parts III.A and III.B.
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REA, but for a different reason. Preemption analysis actually requires
that result.164 However, as explained below, preemption analysis also
accounts for federalism in a way that is inconsistent with an unyield-
ing commitment to procedural uniformity.165
B. Justifications for Incorporating State Policy Interests into
Interpretations of the Federal Rules: The Case for
Conflict Avoidance
In contrast to the commentators who criticized Gasperini (and
the Shady Grove dissent) for undermining the national uniformity of
the Federal Rules, others have interpreted Gasperini’s directive that
federal courts should interpret the Federal Rules with sensitivity to
important state interests as reflecting a legitimate concern for the
“substantive rights” limitation of the REA.166 Under this view, Hanna
may be a preemption rule gone awry with profound potential to in-
trude into legitimate matters of state regulation.167 In contrast to the
procedural uniformist approach, this perspective defers to state poli-
cymaking, resulting in a framework in which the Federal Rules and
state procedures coexist in the federal system, with courts striving to
harmonize them by interpreting the Federal Rules to avoid conflicts.
This article refers to this as the “conflict avoidism” approach.
Adam Steinman has argued that conflict avoidism is statutorily
mandated in that deference to state interests flows from the language
164. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521–22 (1992) (“‘We
must give effect to [a statute’s] plain language unless there is good reason to believe
Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning.’” (quoting
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)).
165. See infra Part IV.
166. Freer, Gasperini, supra note 95, at 1643–44 (“[The Court] adopt[ed] a position R
long advocated by Professor Wright—that it is entirely appropriate for a federal court
to assess the impact of a broad reading of a Federal Rule in construing that Rule;
indeed, as Professor Wright has demonstrated, the concern reflected in the “substan-
tive rights” limitation of the REA counsels such sensitive interpretation.” (footnote
omitted)).
This reading of the REA contrasts with Stephen Burbank’s conclusion, based on
research into the complex legislative history of the REA, that the REA’s second sen-
tence, forbidding the making of Rules intruding into substantive rights, was intended
by its drafters to be mere “[s]urplusage,” the original purpose of which was not to
protect state law. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1015, 1107–08 (1982) [hereinafter Burbank, REA]. But see Ides, Stan-
dard, supra note 11, at 1063 (interpreting the same sentence as a “congressional man- R
date that expressly limits the scope of the congressional delegation of rulemaking
authority to the Supreme Court”).
167. See Richard D. Freer, Erie’s Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. Rev. 1087, 1121
(1989) [hereinafter Freer, Erie] (describing the Court’s efforts to avoid applying
Hanna).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 34 28-MAR-13 9:50
220 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:187
of the REA’s limitation regarding “substantive rights.”168 This argu-
ment depends on how one defines the “substantive rights” that the
Federal Rules may not “abridge, enlarge or modify” under the REA—
a task the Court has strained to avoid. There are many competing defi-
nitions of “substantive rights.”169 Justice Harlan’s definition from his
concurrence in Hanna is as good a starting point as any: he would
inquire whether “the choice of rule would substantially affect those
primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional
system leaves to state regulation.”170 John Hart Ely would have in-
quired whether a right was “granted for . . . some purpose or purposes
not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation pro-
cess.”171 Judge Richard Posner similarly described such rights as
“shap[ing] conduct outside the courtroom and not just improv[ing]the
accuracy or lower[ing] the cost of judicial process.172 Applying any of
these definitions, however, has bedeviled courts since the earliest days
of the Rules.173 Indeed, a crisp separation of categories has proven
elusive.
Categorical definitions of substance and procedure tend to be
problematic because states use procedural tools to shape wide-ranging
policy goals.174 State laws targeting the mode of litigation have long
been used to shape public policy under the label of “tort reform.”175
For example, some states use compulsory arbitration procedures,
168. See Steinman, Judicial Federalism, supra note 8, at 288 n.249. R
169. Id.
170. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
171. Ely, supra note 19, at 725. R
172. S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (1995);
see also Ides, Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 81 (“[T]he difference is between rules R
that can be fairly characterized as housekeeping matters and rules more appropriately
described as architectural or house building.”).
173. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10–14 (1941) (analyzing
whether Rule 35 affected substantive rights); id. at 17–18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the majority’s understanding of the substantive nature of the state
right).
174. See Freer, Erie, supra note 167, at 1134 (“[A] state rule rationally classified as R
either substantive or procedural may function to define the substantive law.”); Whit-
ten, supra note 5, at 132 (“[S]tate legislatures often create procedural rules for reasons R
that have nothing to do with the sort of efficiency policies that normally underpin such
rules. Rather, the reasons often embody policies that are directed at limiting the scope
of claims, defenses, or remedies available for the violation of primary rights existing
under state law.”).
175. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1996)
(discussing the reasons the New York legislature adopted its standard for granting
new trials for excessive jury verdicts); see also John A. Lynch, Jr., Federal Procedure
& Erie: Saving State Litigation Reform Through Comparative Impairment, 30 WHIT-
TIER L. REV. 283, 309–20 (2008) (discussing examples of state tort reform measures
that use procedural devices to achieve their ends).
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mandatory screening panels, and other special procedural devices in
medical malpractice cases.176 While these procedures directly affect
the litigation process, their goal is to reduce malpractice insurance pre-
miums.177 This is in turn supposed to diminish the number of doctors
leaving high-risk medical specialty fields and make healthcare more
accessible to patients.178 By every definition, the latter goals are sub-
stantive, though the means used to further those goals are procedural,
most likely because litigation is itself perceived as causing social
problems outside the courtroom.179
This type of procedural rule presents special problems in diver-
sity cases for those who want to make sense of whether a Federal Rule
176. See Shirley Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 417 (1986); David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States Afford
a “No-Fault” System of Compensation for Medical Injury?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1991, at 1, 16 & n.79.
177. See Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insur-
ance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 761 (1977) (“The ap-
parent connection between the increasing number of malpractice claims and rising
malpractice insurance rates has prompted many state legislatures to consider the adop-
tion of sweeping changes in the substantive and procedural rules governing the adju-
dication of medical malpractice claims.”) (emphasis added).
178. See id. at 760.
179. In another example, California, like many states, enacted procedures allowing
defendants sued for exercising their free speech rights to end litigation quickly and
transfer the costs of defending the suit to the plaintiff. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 425.16 (West 2010). Dubbed “strategic lawsuits against public participation”
(SLAPPs), such suits allegedly chill protected activity by threatening the speaker with
a meritless suit. The “anti-SLAPP” measures in California’s Code of Civil Procedure
include a special motion to strike the plaintiff’s pleadings, id. § 425.16(b)(1), which
suspends access to discovery until the court rules on whether the plaintiff can show a
probability the claim will prevail. Id. § 425.16(b), (g). The purpose of these proce-
dures is to “encourage continued participation in matters of public significance,” id.
§ 425.16(a), a goal that appears to satisfy virtually any definition of “substantive.”
However, the state legislature chose procedural tools relating to litigation administra-
tion (e.g., a special motion to strike, burden shifting, and denial of discovery). Unsur-
prisingly, lower federal courts disagree about whether anti-SLAPP procedural devices
should apply in diversity cases, as the substance/procedure distinction provides so
little traction. Two circuits would apply state anti-SLAPP procedures in a diversity
case. United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d
963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 81 (1st Cir. 2010); accord
La. Crisis Assistance Ctr. v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 827 F. Supp. 2d 668, 680 (E.D. La.
2011), vacated, No. 11–2102, 2012 WL 2717075, at *8 (E.D. La. July 9, 2012); cf.
Armington v. Fink, No. 09–6785, 2010 WL 743524, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2010)
(applying Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute). However, several district courts have
taken the opposite view. E.g., Stuborn Ltd. P’ship v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312,
316 (D. Mass. 2003); Satkar Hospitality Inc. v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, No. 10 C
6682, 2011 WL 2182106, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2011); 1524948 Alberta Ltd. v.
Lee, No. 1:10-CV-02735-RWS, 2011 WL 2899385, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. July 15, 2011);
see also Lynch, supra note 180, at 317–20 (reviewing earlier inconsistent federal
opinions).
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should apply by relying on the REA’s language prohibiting impinge-
ment on “substantive rights.” Those who favor accommodating state
policymaking in substantive areas thus have to contend with the ana-
lytic structure’s historical difficulty in areas where procedural rules
operate to effect substantive policy goals. Moreover, there are impor-
tant substantive implications in variations between state and federal
procedural rules in a wide variety of other areas, including pleading
and summary judgment standards.180
Even if the fluid boundary between substance and procedure
could be meaningfully identified in a landscape where many rules
have both attributes, one commentator has observed that reading the
REA’s prohibition on modifying substantive rights as an affirmative
protection for important state interests potentially runs into trouble in
the legislative history of the REA.181 Stephen Burbank concludes that
there is no evidence that the bill’s drafters were concerned in 1934
that the Federal Rules would displace state law.182 The substantive
rights that the REA protected from infringement were originally
thought to be federally created rights.183 Burbank reads the REA’s
legislative history as implying that the restriction on affecting substan-
tive rights prohibited the enactment of Rules “having an effect on
rights recognized by the substantive law that is predictable and identi-
fiable,”184 in order to reserve to Congress the power to engage in fed-
eral lawmaking.185 This approach returns to the need to separate
substantive rights from procedural ones. It also appears to potentially
tolerate serious effects upon substantive rights (however defined),
180. See Steinman, Judicial Federalism, supra note 8, at 288–90; see also Jeffrey O. R
Cooper, Summary Judgment in the Shadow of Erie, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1245, 1246
(2010) (arguing that the doctrinal confusion in this area makes “uniform summary
judgment practice in federal courts . . . uncertain”).
181. Burbank, REA, supra note 166, at 1025, 1108–11. R
182. Id.; cf. Ely, supra note 19, at 720–21 (“The limiting language of the Enabling R
Act’s second sentence (‘abridge, enlarge or modify’) is strong . . . .”).
183. The drafters most likely focused on federally created substantive rights because
pre-1934, when the REA was being drafted, Erie had not yet been issued. See Bur-
bank, REA, supra note 166, at 1109; Ely, supra note, 19 at 720–21. R
184. Burbank, REA, supra note 166, at 1160. R
185. Id. at 1114. Martin Redish and Dinnish Murashko critiqued Burbank’s interpre-
tation of the REA and its legislative history. See Martin H. Redish & Dinnish
Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson
in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 67–87 (2008). They interpret the
REA’s limitation on affecting substantive rights as meaning that procedural rules’
non-incidental effects on substantive rights are forbidden, but incidental effects are
acceptable. Id. at 86–87 (deriving the “incidental-effects test” from the Court’s read-
ing of the REA in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987)).
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where those effects may not have been identifiable at the time of the
rulemaking.
Both the uniformist and avoidist interpretations of the Rules are
valuable contributions—they illuminate important values at stake on
both sides of the debate. The Court itself continues to vacillate be-
tween commitments to federal procedural uniformity (as reflected in
the majority opinion in Shady Grove) and conflict avoidance (as re-
flected in the majority opinion in Gasperini). Ultimately, both ap-
proaches have failed to produce settled doctrine, despite
approximately seven decades of precedent.
This article proposes an alternative approach. It seeks to avert the
troublesome substance-procedural dichotomy that has plagued both
existing approaches by looking to preemption doctrine and the federal-
ism canons of statutory construction to determine the scope of the
REA. Part III examines the theoretical foundations of federalism in
both preemption doctrine and the Erie-line of cases, arguing they are
closely related. I then trace the evolution of the federalism canons of
statutory construction, which presume that Congress does not intend
to alter the federalism balance between state and federal governments
absent some clear indication from Congress. I conclude that those ca-
nons have relevance for understanding the scope of the Court’s
rulemaking power in the REA, independent of the REA’s textual lim-
its on abridging substantive rights.
III.
FEDERALISM AS A BACKDROP TO PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
AND ERIE
The fundamental question that arises when the Federal Rules are
in conflict with state law in cases heard in federal court is one of
diversity preemption (i.e., whether the Federal Rule should displace
the state law in the federal forum).186 The balance of power between
the state and federal governments is a central problem in such
cases.187 Understanding the interplay between state laws and the Fed-
186. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1453 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing problem of “judicially created rules displac-
ing state substantive law”); see also supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (dis- R
cussing preemption in diversity cases).
187. See, e.g., Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 (“Congress struck [a balance] be-
tween uniform rules of federal procedure and respect for a State’s construction of its
own rights and remedies”); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 887 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the case “raises important questions concerning
the way in which the Federal Government may exercise its undoubted power to oust
state courts of their traditional jurisdiction over common-law tort actions”). Some
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eral Rules thus requires acknowledgement of the background princi-
ples of federalism against which Congress legislates (in authorizing
the promulgation of the Rules) and the Court adjudicates (in promul-
gating, interpreting, and applying the Rules). The Constitution limits
the risk of congressional overreaching not only through restrictions on
what Congress can control through legislation, but on how it exercises
that control.188 For example, Congress exercises its legislative power
through elected representatives who often have incentives to defend
state interests.189
The Court has identified several justifications for its fidelity to
federalism in its preemption case law. It recognizes the democratic
advantages of local control, where state governments are in a position
to be more responsive to their citizens’ needs and “increase[ ] oppor-
tunit[ies] for citizen involvement in democratic processes.”190 Addi-
tionally, the Court invokes the Jeffersonian view of states as
experimental actors capable of innovative policy approaches that can
be implemented on a small scale to test their efficacy, without posing
a risk that those efforts will have a significant impact beyond that
scholars regard preemption as the key problem that modern federalism theory must
confront. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institu-
tional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733,
1848 (2005).
188. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985)
(quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)).
189. Id. at 550–51 (describing the states’ direct influence in the Senate and indirect
influence over the House of Representatives and presidency). See generally Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Com-
position & Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954)
(discussing the various mechanisms and effects of the representational system). Her-
bert Wechsler’s contribution in this area is undergoing something of a renaissance,
with several modern commentators offering excellent analyses of the role of the Con-
stitution’s structure in safeguarding federalism. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separa-
tion of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2001)
[hereinafter Bradford Clark, Separation of Powers] (arguing the constitutional proce-
dures for making federal law serve to protect state authority by making the process to
displace state law fairly difficult); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 252–62 (2000) (making
the historical case that the Framers expected Congress to be restrained from intruding
on state sovereignty through the states’ power to compose and select the national
government); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1349, 1355 (2007) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers] (demonstrating Madison’s
emphasis on the constitutional structure as means to safeguard the institutional role of
the states).
190. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 1313, 1324–25 (2004) (observing theories of federalism generally present in
the case law).
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state’s borders if the experiment fails.191 It also perceives federalism’s
decentralization as promoting fundamental liberties by avoiding the
concentration of power in any one governmental actor.192
These federalism theories value states’ autonomy because of the
way the exercise of that autonomy improves the process of govern-
ance. In this sense, they are neutral, for they do not favor any particu-
lar type of policymaking decisions within states, but rather focus on
the procedural benefits of having decentralized policymaking gener-
ally. These values are not without controversy,193 but they lurk within
many of the Court’s post-Erie cases.
In Part III.A, this article examines the relationship between these
federalism concerns and preemption doctrine. Part III.B then reveals
the deep connection between preemption doctrine and Erie.
A. Preemption Doctrine Against the Backdrop of Federalism
In the preemption context, the Court has applied at least two im-
portant canons of statutory construction dedicated to safeguarding fed-
eralism. The first is a general canon applicable whenever the Court is
invoking the doctrine of implied preemption, where Congress has
made no express statement about whether a statute should preempt
state law.194 It presumes that federal statutes generally do not displace
state laws unless Congress has manifested its intent to do so.195 Ac-
cording to the Court, preemption of state law “‘start[s] with the as-
sumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.”196 Following this general federalism canon, it is
not enough for a state law merely to frustrate a federal purpose.197 In
the absence of clear statutory language, rebutting the presumption re-
191. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“This federalist structure . . . allows for more
innovation and experimentation in government.”).
192. See id.; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1984); Garcia,
469 U.S. at 582 (Powell, J., dissenting).
193. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1
(2002) (arguing federalism is inferior to centralization of governmental decision-mak-
ing for various policy reasons).
194. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“Pre-
emption may be either expressed or implied and ‘is compelled whether Congress’
[sic] command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in
its structure and purpose.’” (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977)).
195. Bradford Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 189, at 1425. R
196. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (alterations in original).
197. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 905–06 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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quires a showing that preemption is implicitly required by the statu-
tory structure or purpose.198
A second, more powerful federalism canon appears in the Court’s
“clear statement rule,” which creates a strong presumption that Con-
gress does not intend a statute to alter the usual constitutional balance
between the states and the federal government.199 This presumption
can only be negated by “unmistakably clear” language in the text of
the statute.200 Applied less frequently than the general presumption
against preemption, this form of the canon is harder to rebut and re-
quires a much stronger showing of intent. It stems from the Court’s
view that “Congress does not readily interfere” with the states’ sover-
eign powers.201
Both federalism canons impose no fixed limits on Congress’s
power to displace state law. They allow Congress to exercise its legis-
lative power freely, so long as it actually manifests its intent to dis-
place state law. However, the Court will not use judicial suppositions
where Congress fails to demonstrate its own preemptive intent.202
Additionally, both canons protect what the Court has termed
“weighty and constant values,”203 by ensuring that Congress actually
198. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 615.
199. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (quoting Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1984)).
200. Id.
201. See id. at 461; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (explaining that the canon uses judicial interpretation “to
require[ ] an extraordinarily specific statement on the face of the statute for Congress
to limit the states. . . .”).
202. The Court’s inconsistency in applying these federalism canons has earned con-
siderable criticism. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000)
(“Most commentators who write about preemption agree on at least one thing: Mod-
ern preemption jurisprudence is a muddle.”); Garrick B. Pursley, Avoiding Deference
Questions, 44 TULSA L. REV. 557, 557 (2009) (describing preemption doctrine as
“notoriously muddled”); Robert N. Weiner, The Height of Presumption: Preemption
& the Role of the Courts, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 727, 727 (2009) (“Few aspects of
Supreme Court jurisprudence are as contradictory and convoluted as the so-called
‘presumption against preemption.’”). This inconsistency shows that the Supreme
Court’s preemption jurisprudence has become disconnected from its underlying val-
ues. See Chemerinsky, supra note 190, at 1314 (describing the inconsistency); id. at R
1327 (charging the Court with a results-oriented jurisprudence in its preemption cases
where federal civil rights laws lack preemptive force against state challenges, but
businesses relying on federal statutes to challenge state regulations prevail). The im-
perfection of the Court’s application of the federalism canons (and the Court’s occa-
sional failure to apply them at all) should not detract from the canons’ utility in
serving the background principles of federalism. The Court could solve the problem
simply by applying this doctrine more consistently, at least in the so-called “procedu-
ral Erie” cases.
203. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
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considered and intended the displacement of state law.204 As the
states’ primary protection against federal intrusion into areas histori-
cally regulated by the states is located in the political processes in
Congress, these presumptions ensure that the preemption question is
actually part of that political process.205 In other words, they enforce
the political safeguards of federalism by requiring the political
branches to consider the state interests at stake before preempting
them. Members of Congress (and potentially the President) must an-
swer to state voters, who may value their own state’s legislation.206
The constitutional structure favors the federalism canons because the
states have influence in the selection of elected members of the politi-
cal branches, but they lack representation in the federal judiciary.207
The canons arguably are a mechanism to assign the counterma-
joritarian costs in any preemption calculus. Preemption asks whether
the laws enacted by a democratically elected state legislature will be
ignored by the unelected federal judiciary in a given case. It thus nec-
essarily entails some countermajoritarian cost.208 These costs can be
placed upon either Congress (by requiring some indicia that Congress
considered the state interest at stake before giving the federal law pre-
emptive force) or the states (through preemption without indicia of
congressional intent to displace state law).
Placing these costs on Congress, which can still enact the federal
legislation and displace state law as needed after proper consideration,
has a less onerous countermajoritarian effect than the alternative of
allowing the judiciary to replace Congress as the entity deciding
204. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464; Bradford Clark, Separation of Powers, supra
note 189, at 1425; Young, Two Cheers, supra note 189, at 1385. R
205. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464 (“[T]o give the state-displacing weight of federal
law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking
on which [the Court] relied [in Garcia] to protect states’ interests.”) (quoting LAW-
RENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6–25, 480 (2d ed. 1988)).
206. See Nelson, supra note 202, at 280–81 (discussing political safeguards on state R
interests in Congress). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 190, at 1315, 1332 (observ- R
ing that some of the Supreme Court’s major federalism decisions in the last decade
have favored preemption of state laws).
207. Bradford Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 189, at 1429 (“[T]he Consti- R
tution gives states a role in selecting Congress and the President, but not federal
courts.”).
208. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 201, at 637–39 (describing the canons as R
being “quasi–constitutional” rules reflecting “a certain judicial haughtiness and un-
cooperativeness” with Congress, operating as a “backdoor” form of “constitutional
activism”). Given the Court’s own doctrinal inconsistency, where it adopts some form
of these canons when it wants to do so but seems to ignore them in other cases,
suspicion arises that it is engaging in outcome-oriented reasoning, using the canons as
a tool to reach desired results. One response may be that the Court should be using
some version of the canon more consistently to constrain this temptation.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 42 28-MAR-13 9:50
228 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16:187
whether preemption is sound policy. This is true whether federalism is
potentially an “underenforced constitutional norm[ ],”209 or an ade-
quately-enforced one (a distinction that requires a value judgment
about how much state autonomy is ideal in the federal system). At
least in areas where Congress has the power to displace state law but
has to decide how much of that power to actually exercise, enforce-
ment of the federalism canons ensures that the decision about how
much state autonomy is ideal is vested in the political branches, rather
than in the judiciary. This ultimately minimizes the countermajori-
tarian cost of applying the canons.210
In the following discussion, this article turns to the historical
evolution of the federalism canons as methods of protecting the politi-
cal process in which preemption issues are properly located.
1. The Twentieth-Century Roots of the Federalism Canons
As early as 1902, the Court pronounced that “[i]t should never be
held that Congress intends to supersede . . . the exercise of the police
powers of the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to
effect that result is clearly manifested.”211 Similar statements appeared
several times in other opinions in the early twentieth century.212 The
209. Id. at 597.
210. See id. (conceding that “the Court may have a legitimate role in forcing the
political process to pay attention to the constitutional values at stake, and
super–strong clear statement rules are a practical way for the Court to focus legisla-
tive attention on these values”). Despite this functional utility, the derivation of the
federalism canons has occasionally come under scholarly criticism, disputing the his-
torical or textual constitutional source of the canons. See Nelson, supra note 202, at R
242–44, 255–58 (concluding that the Framers would not have understood there to be a
general presumption disfavoring the preemption of state law); see also John F. Man-
ning, Clear Statement Rules & the Constitution, 110 COLUM L. REV. 399, 411, 427,
432–33 (2010) (arguing that Gregory’s clear statement rule lacks a textual basis and
exceeds the text’s own limits on congressional power based on vague structural prin-
ciples). But see Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional In-
terpretation: An Essay for Phil Frickey, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1384–85 (2010)
(showing clear statement rules can be functionally derived from the Constitution’s
structure). This constitutional debate is largely beyond the scope of this article.
211. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902); see also Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S.
501, 533 (1912).
212. See, e.g., Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisc. Emp. Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740, 749 (1942); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940) (“As a matter of
statutory construction Congressional intention to displace local laws in the exercise of
its commerce power is not, in general, to be inferred unless clearly indicated by those
considerations which are persuasive of the statutory purpose. This is especially the
case when public safety and health are concerned.”); H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hamp-
shire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939) (“[I]t cannot be inferred that Congress intended to super-
sede any state safety measure prior to the taking effect of a federal measure found
suitable to put in its place. Its purpose to displace the local law must be definitely
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 43 28-MAR-13 9:50
2013] CONSTRAINING THE FEDERAL RULES 229
Court’s presumption against preemption gathered steam in the middle
of the century in large measure due to the work of Justice Frankfurter.
In 1947, he presented a lecture to the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, setting forth a theory of statutory interpretation that
called for deference to state policies when interpreting acts of Con-
gress.213 He explained that “[t]he underlying assumptions of our dual
form of government, and the consequent presuppositions of legislative
draftsmanship which are expressive of our history and habits” require
narrow interpretations of federal statutes, such that judges should as-
sume that where congressional regulation “readjusts the balance of
state and national authority,” Congress would be explicit about its in-
tent to do so.214
In the same year that Justice Frankfurter underscored the impor-
tance of this interpretive model in his speech, the Court decided Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator.215 The majority acknowledged an “assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”216 The Court referred to the states’ police powers in the
constitutional sense, where state police powers have historically had a
very broad meaning, “extend[ing] to all the great public needs.”217
Looking back to the legislative history of the federal statute in
question, the Court concluded that Congress intended to occupy the
field of warehouse regulation, leaving no room for states to act.218
expressed.”); Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 12 (1937) (“The
purpose of Congress to supersede or exclude state action . . . is not lightly to be
inferred. The intention so to do must definitely and clearly appear.”) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R, Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)
(“The intention of Congress to exclude States from exerting their police power must
be clearly manifested.”).
213. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 539–40 (1947). Specifically addressing new regulatory acts enacted pursu-
ant to the Commerce Clause, Frankfurter described the judge’s task as “one of accom-
modation as between assertions of new federal authority and historic functions of the
individual states.” Id. (“Federal legislation of this character cannot therefore be con-
strued without regard to the implications of our dual system of government.”).
214. See id. at 540.
215. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
216. Id. at 230.
217. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (stating that the
police power “may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the
prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately
necessary to the public welfare”); see also Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504,
583 (1847) (“[W]hat are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its do-
minions.”), rev’d on other grounds, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
218. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 234–35 (1947).
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Justice Frankfurter dissented, finding the indicia of congressional in-
tent inadequate. He called for a high bar for inferring any congres-
sional intent to displace state regulation of an area historically
regulated by the states.219 The majority opinion in Rice is often cited
as an important example of the general federalism canon operating in
a case of implied preemption where Congress has signaled its intent to
occupy an entire field of regulation.220 Yet, Justice Frankfurter’s dis-
sent arguably became the foundation for the modern clear statement
rule.
The high bar Justice Frankfurter proposed in his dissent reflected
his disinclination to displace state regulations in areas historically en-
trusted to the states, consistent with his view that safeguarding federal-
ism was among the Court’s highest priorities.221 He favored the
decentralization of power through the individual states, particularly
when the centralizing force originated from the Court, not from
Congress.222
Justice Frankfurter’s interpretive model appears particularly sig-
nificant when juxtaposed against his views in the post-Erie era, which
reflect the same federalism theme.223 While on the Court, he viewed
diversity jurisdiction as an exception to the boundary defining state
jurisdiction, and thus as something to be construed narrowly.224 He
219. Id. at 245 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ( “[N]othing but the clearest expression
should persuade us that the federal Act wiped out State fixation of rates and other
State requirements deeply rooted in their laws.”) (emphasis added).
220. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
221. Albert M. Sacks, Felix Frankfurter, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789–1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2406 (Leon Fried-
man & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969); see also Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frank-
furter: the Architect of ‘Our Federalism’, 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 702 (1993)
(documenting Frankfurter’s commitment to federal judicial deference to the states).
222. See Sacks, supra note 221, at 2412 (“[H]e saw value in leaving states free to R
work out their own destiny through a process of trial and error.”). In this, he shared
some the federalism vision of Justice Brandeis, who “preferred that power be lodged
with [state legislatures] rather than with the federal government” because of “bigness
and centralization of power.” PHILLIPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PROGRESSIVISM
83 (1993).
223. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 16–19 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109–10 (1945). Some commenta-
tors actually credit Justice Frankfurter’s work as a law professor for helping to bring
about the decision in Erie, even though he was not yet on the Court. E.g.,
McManamon, supra note 221, at 749 (“Cornell professor Arthur John Keeffe asserted R
that ‘the propaganda which brought us Erie R.R. v. Tompkins [was] the Harvard Law
School party line of the days when Felix Frankfurter was a Professor.’”) (internal
citation omitted); id. at 754–55 (arguing that Frankfurter may even have helped in-
spire the structure for Brandeis’s opinion while Frankfurter was still at Harvard).
224. Louis L. Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, 62
HARV. L. REV. 357, 379 (1949); see also id. at 380 (describing Frankfurter’s view of
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understood that because federal diversity jurisdiction always assumes
control of a matter grounded in state policymaking, the federalism
stakes are especially high.
2. The Rise of the Clear Statement Rule
In the mid-1980s, the Court found its way back to Justice Frank-
furter’s view of statutory interpretation. Citing his 1947 speech at
length in a footnote in Kelly v. Robinson,225 the Court applied his
theory to interpret the Bankruptcy Code.226 Where the federal statute
appeared to be at odds with Connecticut’s restitution provisions for
criminal defendants,227 the Court acknowledged the state’s strong in-
terest in its own victim restitution policy and the lack of evidence that
Congress intended to override that historical state regulation.228
The new clear statement rule found its boldest expression in
1991, in Gregory v. Ashcroft.229 The plaintiffs, who were state judges,
claimed that a Missouri state constitutional provision requiring munic-
ipal judges to retire at age seventy230 violated the federal Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA).231 The ADEA prohibits
employers from discharging any individual who is over forty years old
on the basis of that individual’s age.232 Congress’s intent was ambigu-
ous as to the inclusion of appointed state judges under the ADEA, so
the Court declined to find that the statute included them, even though
Congress had the constitutional power to do.233
The Court recognized the importance in our dual system of gov-
ernment of dispersing power to the states to ensure that the govern-
ment is “more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous
society,” while adhering to the ideal of local “innovation and experi-
mentation,”234 two classic visions of federalism. As a check on the
Supremacy Clause’s power to impose federal power upon the states,
the Court reasoned that the nature of the federal system requires the
Court to “assume Congress does not exercise [that power] lightly.”235
the policy of diversity jurisdiction as one of “jealous restriction, of avoiding offense to
state sensitiveness”) (quoting Indianapolis v. State Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941)).
225. 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.11 (1986).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 39–40.
228. Id. at 53.
229. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
230. Id. at 455.
231. Id. at 455–56.
232. 29 U.S.C §§ 621–634 (1967).
233. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470.
234. Id. at 458.
235. Id. at 460.
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This view echoed Justice Frankfurter’s view of the Court’s role in
regulating the constitutional structure. In this context, federal interfer-
ence with the state’s method for selecting its own judicial officers
“would upset the usual constitutional balance of federal and state pow-
ers.”236 The Court assumed that Congress did not intend to alter this
federalism balance absent a clear statement of intent.237
In 1994, the Court again cited Justice Frankfurter’s 1947 speech
in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., a case that expanded the application
of the clear statement rule.238 BFP involved a decision about whether
the federal Bankruptcy Code preempted state procedures for foreclos-
ing on real property and would void a sale that was lawful under state
law.239 The Court applied a version of the clear statement rule,240 not
only presuming Congress did not intend to displace state regulation of
real estate foreclosures,241 but also looking for a clear statutory state-
ment to rebut that presumption.242 It concluded that doubt as to con-
gressional intent must always be resolved in favor of preserving
traditional state regulation.243
Foreshadowing language in Gasperini, BFP interpreted this fed-
eralism canon as applying where “[f]ederal statutes imping[e] upon
important state interests.”244 Its application was triggered by a state
interest involving “the general welfare of society.”245 Thus, the feder-
alism canon’s sweep became quite broad. In other words, the canon
was not limited to matters directly related to state sovereignty in the
sense of how the state organizes its own government, as addressed in
Gregory. Rather, after BFP, the canon could conceivably encompass
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994).
239. Id. at 534. As the sale was sanctioned by the state’s foreclosure law, the ques-
tion was whether to void a sale that was lawful under state law based on the federal
statutory provision allowing the bankruptcy trustee to avoid fraudulent transfers. Id. at
534–35.
240. Id. at 539–40 (“Absent a clear statutory requirement to the contrary, we must
assume the validity of this state-law regulatory background and take due account of its
effect. ‘The existence and force and function of established institutions of local gov-
ernment are always in the consciousness of lawmakers and, while their weight may
vary, they may never be completely overlooked in the task of interpretation.’” (quot-
ing Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 154 (1944)).
241. Id. at 544.
242. Id. at 539. While it left open the possibility that the statute might override the
state law “by implication,” such an implication must be unambiguous. Id. at 546.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 544 (emphasis added).
245. Id. (“‘The general welfare of society is involved in the security of the titles to
real estate’ and the power to ensure that security ‘inheres in the very nature of [state]
government.’”) (internal citation omitted).
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all matters that affect state sovereignty in the much broader sense of
authority over the general welfare.246 Where Congress’s intent to
override the state interest in that area is unclear, the Court held that
“our federal system demands deference to long-established traditions
of state regulation.”247
B. The Connection Between Erie and the Federalism Canons
Elements of the political safeguards of federalism are at the heart
of not only preemption jurisprudence, but also in the modern reading
of Erie as reflecting a form of prudential judicial restraint.248 While
not without its critics,249 this modern understanding posits that Erie’s
elusive constitutional holding rests on a particularly narrow vision of
judicial power that constrains judicial supervision of the states’ poli-
cymaking choices.250 Paul Mishkin, for example, argued that Erie’s
endorsement of this form of judicial restraint reflected the basic con-
stitutional principle that federal courts are functionally incompetent to
246. See id. at 544 n.8.
247. Id. at 546.
248. See Mishkin, supra note 8, at 1685 (describing the “inappropriateness of federal R
judicial lawmaking” in Erie as resting in part “on the structure established by the
Constitution whereby the states, and their interests as such, are represented in the
Congress but not in the federal courts.”). But see Green, supra note 8, at 615–16 R
(disputing Mishkin’s account as Erie’s “new myth”). For the germinal defense of this
vision of federalism being a key feature in the constitutional design, see Wechsler,
supra note 189. Wechsler identified various mechanisms for states to assert their in- R
terests in the national political process, including their role in selecting and composing
the national government. Id. at 546–49, 552–57 (discussing the equal allocation of
representation in the Senate, and that body’s procedural rules permitting a small mi-
nority of states to impede legislation favored by a majority, the state’s power to con-
trol congressional districting and voter qualifications influencing the House of
Representatives, and the state influence in the Electoral College in selecting the presi-
dent). For examples of criticism of Wechsler’s position, see John C. Yoo, The Judicial
Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997) and Lynn A. Baker, Put-
ting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 951 (2001). Even Wechsler’s critics concede that the constitutional design in-
tended for the states’ involvement in the political branches to play some role in pro-
tecting state interests, even if that was to be a nonexclusive form of protection. See
Yoo, supra, at 1318; see also Baker, supra, at 972. For purposes of this article, the
fact that the political safeguards of federalism are supposed to play some role in pro-
tecting state interests is sufficient to establish the constitutional relevance of those
safeguards and the importance of ensuring their continued functioning. This, in turn,
demonstrates the utility of the federalism canons in preserving those safeguards. See
Young, Two Cheers, supra note 189, at 1367–68. R
249. For thoughtful critiques of the modern understanding of Erie, see Sherry, Worst
Decision, supra note 9, at 143–46 (arguing this interpretation has no textual or con- R
temporaneous support in Erie and is a scholarly reworking of the decision) and Green,
supra note 8, at 618–22. R
250. See Mishkin, supra note 8, at 1683. R
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intrude into state policy decisions in areas Congress has left to the
states.251
It is beyond the scope of this article to resolve the disagreement
between Erie’s critics and those who have read Erie’s text as contain-
ing a constitutional “kernel of truth” reflecting the political safeguards
of federalism, other than to acknowledge that Mishkin’s view has long
been mainstream.252 Instead, this article takes the Court at its word in
modern cases that Erie has some constitutional basis. This prudential
judicial restraint appears to be the thread running through later deci-
sions that explicitly invoke Erie.
Although Erie somewhat cryptically suggested that Congress
lacked the power to enact statutes in the areas covered by the “general
law,”253 Edward Purcell persuasively argued that Erie’s implicit point
(which seems to have coalesced in the institutional significance of
Erie developed in later cases) was not about a limitation on Con-
gress’s power, but rather on the judiciary’s.254 Instead of limiting
Congress’s power to act, Erie implied “that the federal courts should
not—at least generally—initiate federal lawmaking even over areas in
which Congress does have authority if Congress has not acted to as-
sert federal control over that area.”255
This narrow reading of the Court’s power flows in part from sep-
aration of powers (as Ely recognized), in that the judiciary’s powers
are limited to those defined by the Constitution or legitimately author-
ized by Congress,256 and in part from functional differentiation of
251. Id. at 1686–87.
252. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION
177 (2000) [hereinafter PURCELL, BRANDEIS]; Bradford Clark, Erie, supra note 5, at R
1290 (agreeing with Mishkin’s account of Erie’s constitutional rationale); Young,
Preemption, supra note 15, at 1658 n.94 (describing the “view that Erie was, in fact, R
firmly grounded in separation of powers concerns about judicial lawmaking” as
“widespread”).
253. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938).
254. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 60
n.116 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2008) [hereinafter Purcell, Erie] (“Congress almost
certainly had authority to legislate over the facts of Erie, that is, over injuries to
bystanders caused by railroads operating in interstate commerce.”); see also id. at 62.
But see Sherry, Worst Decision, supra note 9, at 151–53 (arguing that Erie’s view of R
judicial restraint was misguided).
255. Purcell, Erie, supra note 254, at 60 n.116 (emphasis added). R
256. Id. at 59 (“Erie embodied a coherent and soundly based theory inspired by
Brandeis’s progressive faith in democratic government and legislative primacy, one
rooted in the Constitution’s fundamental structural principles. The first principle was
that the Constitution made Congress the law making branch of the national govern-
ment and delegated to it the legislative powers of that government.”).
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powers based on spheres of competence (as Mishkin recognized).257
This latter element underscores the federal judiciary’s functional in-
competence to engage in the political balancing.258
Under this reading, Erie can be understood as a reflection of judi-
cial restraint and a corollary form of federalism.259 According to Pur-
cell, “congressional abstention in any area within its authority
represented a political judgment by the representative branch that
states should exercise control in that area, and the courts should defer
to that judgment.”260 This mirrors the principles underlying the feder-
alism canons.
Erie’s facts implicated the Rules of Decision Act (RDA),261
rather than the Enabling Act. Nevertheless, reading Erie as reflecting
federal judicial restraint with regard to state policymaking choices has
profound implications for interpreting the Court’s own power under
the REA to displace state laws. While critics of this modern under-
standing view Erie as reflecting something quite different,262 the mod-
ern understanding of Erie meshes tightly with the judicial philosophy
of Erie’s author. Justice Brandeis was familiar with the risk the Fed-
eral Rules posed to federalism. In fact, he had long opposed the pas-
sage of the REA.263 He was also the lone justice dissenting from the
Court’s approval of the newly promulgated Rules in 1937.264 Purcell’s
historical research showed that Brandeis “cherished the hope that Con-
257. Mishkin, supra note 8, at 1686–87 (describing “the constitutional perception R
that courts are inappropriate makers of laws intruding upon the states’ views of social
policy in the areas of state competence”).
258. Id.; see also PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 252, at 174 (“Brandeis considered R
the judiciary, in contrast to the legislature, unsuited to the task of establishing the kind
of laws that were necessary to deal with complex social and economic issues.”).
259. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 252, at 177 (interpreting one of Erie’s points R
as being that “the federal courts should not, without compelling reason, displace state
rules with those of their own making because Congress had not passed legislation to
cover the facts of Erie.”).
260. Id. at 174 (emphasis added). In the context of Erie, “because Congress had not
asserted national authority in the area, the judiciary should follow suit and apply state
law.” Id.
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948) (requiring that federal courts apply state law as rules
of decision in civil actions “except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide”).
262. For thoughtful critiques of the modern understanding of Erie, see Sherry, Worst
Decision, supra note 9, at 143–46 (arguing that this interpretation has no textual or R
contemporaneous support in Erie and is a scholarly reworking of the decision), and
Green, supra note 8, at 618–22. R
263. PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 252, at 135. R
264. Id.
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gress might veto the new [R]ules . . .” because “they represented an-
other example of needless centralization.”265
Justice Brandeis is also remembered for his philosophical mis-
sion against the “Curse of Bigness,” conceived of as concentrations of
power in large governments and large corporations.266 For him, such
political and social actors were inefficient267 and imperiled liberty.268
He preferred entrusting state legislatures rather than the federal gov-
ernment with power because centralization of power tended to foster
corruption.269 He also lauded experimentation by small governmental
units whose promising solutions might be transferred to other
states.270 All of these views have familiar expressions in modern pre-
emption doctrine and are consistent with the modern reading of Erie
as embodying a principle of judicial restraint.
Under the federalism canons, congressional silence generally cre-
ates spaces for state autonomy, even in areas that Congress has the
power to regulate.271 Silence on the question of preemption reflects
“the structure and limitations of federalism, which allow the States
great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection
of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”272 The
265. Id. at 135–36.
266. STRUM, supra note 222, at 73–74. R
267. Id. at 78.
268. Id. at 82.
269. Id. at 83; PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 252, at 134 (“He believed deeply in R
the virtues of a decentralized federalism and in the advantages of small units of social
organization.”).
270. See PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 252, at 134–35; STRUM, supra note 222, at R
84; see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave respon-
sibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
271. One notable area of exception is in the application of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, where state action can be preempted even where Congress has been silent, if
the state law places an undue burden on interstate commerce. See, e.g., C.A. Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 401–02 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“[T]he [Commerce] Clause not only empowers Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce, but also imposes limitations on the States in the absence of congressional
action”) (emphasis added). The kinds of state regulations at issue in the “procedural
Erie” cases, however, are outside this area of concern, as they are not laws discrimi-
nating against out-of-staters. While it is possible that a state could regulate commerce
using a procedural device in a way that created a discriminatory burden on out-of-
staters, that has never yet been an issue in the cases. Such a case might well require a
different analysis, as it would implicate the Commerce Clause in ways not present in
any of the post-Erie cases to date.
272. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
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Constitution’s structure, in creating a federal government of limited
power, presumes that interstitial lawmaking may be filled by the states
in areas where there is no federal regulation.273 The absence of federal
law is thus an invitation for state law to fill the void.
Congress’s failure to express an intent to preempt state law may
be due to a pure omission (where Congress has not considered the
question at all) or to the political effectiveness of state participation in
the legislative process (where Congress may have considered the
question and decided not to override popular state legislation). Either
possibility precludes substituting judicial preferences for the political
process in making the preemption decision.274
A closely related point is implicit in the modern reading of Erie
as reflecting judicial restraint.275 Erie’s restriction on the federal gen-
eral common law in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority
can be read as reflecting an analogous view of silence as a legal signi-
fier.276 Where both Congress and the Constitution are silent about del-
egating policymaking power to the Court to make federal general
common law in diversity cases that displaces state law, such power
does not exist.277 While applying the federalism canons has been criti-
cized because it involves the Court’s choice of particular values or
policy preferences,278 these values are largely the same values under-
lying the modern understanding of Erie. They are not arbitrary or sub-
jective preferences, but rather values that are embedded in a functional
view of the constitutional structure, which provides for the representa-
tion of state interests within the legislative process.
273. Bradford Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 189, at 1326. R
274. Congressional silence regarding agency actions operates analogously. In the
context of congressional acquiescence to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, the
Court squarely rejected the idea that “failure to express an opinion” regarding regula-
tions was evidence of approval of them. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
750 (2006). The Court explained that only if there was a record that Congress actually
considered and rejected the exact issue before the Court would it deem Congress to
have acquiesced. Id. This view is instructive on the question of congressional silence
regarding preemption as it shows that in other contexts, the Court is unwilling to
assume that silence means that Congress made some affirmative decision. Rather, it
acknowledges the possibility that Congress may not have considered the issue at all,
or may have even made a political decision not to confront the issue because of the
interest groups with stakes in it. See id.
275. See supra Part III.B.
276. See PURCELL, BRANDEIS, supra note 252, at 177. R
277. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (concluding there is no
general federal common law, and the Constitution does not give the Supreme Court
the power to make such law).
278. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 201, at 636–37.
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One commentator has argued for overriding any background pre-
sumption against preemption of state law by weighing whether there
are “dominant federal interest[s]” that override state concerns.279 An-
other commentator has suggested that diversity preemption analysis
and the federalism presumption should be mere factors in interpreting
the Federal Rules (particularly the Rules of Evidence)—but not neces-
sarily determinative ones—as other factors should also be weighed,280
such as the trans-substantive nature of a Rule, implications of policies
extrinsic to the business of the courts, and the importance of the matter
to the orderly functioning of the federal courts.281 Both approaches
overlook the role preemption analysis plays in construing the REA’s
limitation on the Court’s rulemaking power: if Congress did not intend
to displace state laws falling within states’ historic police powers and
instead chose to leave such areas to the states, there are no other inter-
ests or factors to weigh. On the other hand, if it did so intend, then the
Supremacy Clause ends the preemption analysis.
If Congress did not fully delegate the power to make Rules dis-
placing state law in areas Congress has otherwise left to the states to
regulate, the Court may not substitute its own policy judgment for
Congress’s in those areas. The Court simply has no authorization from
Congress to do so. The other factors and considerations suggested by
the commentators become irrelevant if the Court is exceeding its
rulemaking power as delegated by Congress. The argument here is not
that following state procedure would offer the optimal or preferred
solution in any particular circumstance. Instead, it does not matter if it
is less convenient to require district judges to be familiar with state
procedural rules or even whether state procedures are objectively in-
ferior to the Federal Rules.282 Expedience, the convenience or culture
of the federal system, and other concerns would matter only if Con-
279. Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History & Ju-
risprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L.
REV. 611, 645 (2007).
280. Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act)
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 109–12 (1998).
281. Id. at 115–21.
282. One commentator has suggested that Erie should be used to displace state law-
making that federal judges find to be “unwise,” with a high burden for finding that
such laws affect substantive rights. See Stempel, supra note 153, at 969 (“Where R
legislation is the product of haste, misinformation, or unduly narrow interest group
power, or where there is little evidence of public support or strong public benefit,
courts can legitimately take a restrained view in applying the problematic law unless
the law clearly qualifies as substantive for purposes of Erie.”) (emphasis added). Such
an approach is antithetical to the functional role of the judiciary reflected in the mod-
ern understanding of Erie, as well as in all the cases applying any form of the federal-
ism canons.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 53 28-MAR-13 9:50
2013] CONSTRAINING THE FEDERAL RULES 239
gress had expressed intent to displace state law to the extent it was
inconsistent with the general interests of the federal system. Moreover,
multifactor tests are by nature flexible standards with high potential to
create uncertainty. Such uncertainty should not exist for basic ques-
tions regarding summary judgment standards or methods of dis-
missing parties from a suit. For preemption doctrine to be useful in
resolving these questions, it should provide clear results in most cases.
The multifactor or interest-balancing approaches fail to do this. In-
deed, to the extent that the existing cases reflect relative incoherence,
that result may be due to ad hoc balancing of irreconcilable values and
interests.283
As explained in Part IV, preemption doctrine can offer certainty
and improved decision making in this area through a straightforward
application of the federalism canons. It also offers a path out of the
substance versus procedure briar patch.
IV.
APPLYING THE FEDERALISM CANONS OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION TO THE RULES ENABLING ACT
The historical tension between the Court’s commitment to na-
tional procedural uniformity and its deference to state policymaking
has resulted in muddled, unpredictable doctrine applying Erie to cases
involving the scope of the Federal Rules. Indeed, in Shady Grove, the
doctrine was not able to generate a clear answer regarding the scope of
the Court’s rulemaking power under the REA. This Part offers a
method to resolve the confusion that draws on the modern understand-
ing of Erie as a reflection of judicial restraint and connects it to pre-
emption doctrine. As Part III demonstrated, Erie and the federalism
canons of statutory interpretation are twin embodiments of the politi-
cal safeguards of federalism built into the Constitution’s structure.
Connecting Erie to these canons illuminates a path to resolving the
scope of the Court’s rulemaking power. Applying the federalism ca-
nons to the REA is not only consistent with the core values underlying
the modern interpretation of Erie, but also offers a way to account for
commitments to relative procedural uniformity in the federal system
and deference to state policymaking.
This Part will argue that the REA’s scope is somewhat narrower
than has previously been suggested by the Court or other commenta-
tors. It applies the federalism canons and concludes that Congress’s
283. See Freer & Arthur, supra note 97, at 69–76 (discussing the subtextual balanc- R
ing of interests in the cases).
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incomplete delegation of power to the Court to make the Federal
Rules preserved ample space for state policymaking through state pro-
cedural mechanisms in some, but not all, areas. It argues that Congress
did not manifest intent to use the Federal Rules to intrude into areas of
traditional state competence, areas where Congress has declined to en-
gage in national policymaking in order to leave space for states to act
as primary regulators. Applying the federalism canons thus leads to
the conclusion that when the application of the Rules would displace
state laws in such areas, the Rules should yield to state law.
The constitutional power of Congress to enact such legislation,
however, is a different issue from the breadth of the Court’s power to
make Rules based on Congress’s delegation in the REA. The latter
issue requires not only that there be some delegation to the Court, but
also that the delegation be sufficient to support the Federal Rules actu-
ally promulgated. As Congress may delegate less than the full measure
of its power, the terms of delegation are key. There is some dispute
about how much of Congress’s constitutional power was conferred to
the Court in the REA.
Part IV.A thus examines the scope of Congress’s delegation in
the REA. It argues that the scope of the Court’s power to promulgate
Rules under the REA turns on two structural components: (1) Con-
gress’s constitutional power to regulate procedural matters in the fed-
eral courts, and (2) the scope of the statutory delegation of that power
to the Supreme Court. There is little controversy over the first of those
elements,284 and this article assumes there is no reason to doubt the
first element. Part IV.B demonstrates that applying the federalism ca-
nons to the REA leads to a conclusion that the Court’s rulemaking
power is not broad enough to displace state procedural rules that are
part of a state regulatory scheme addressed to areas Congress has left
to the states. It argues that the absence of consideration of state inter-
ests in the original legislative history of the REA, combined with de-
cades of confusion about the scope of the REA and institutional
structural disuniformity built into the Rules themselves, all support a
conclusion that Congress never manifested an intent to use the Rules
to displace matters otherwise within the state’s historic police powers.
Part IV.C then examines the narrowness of the scope of matters within
284. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“[T]he constitutional provision for
a federal court system [in Article III] (augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and
pleading in those courts.”); see also Rowe, supra note 116, at 971–72 (observing the R
stability of this broad interpretation of congressional power in the Court’s Erie-related
decisions); id. at 973 (“[R]ealistic checks on Congress in this area . . . seem to be
those of politics and good sense, rather than constitutional limits.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\16-1\NYL105.txt unknown Seq: 55 28-MAR-13 9:50
2013] CONSTRAINING THE FEDERAL RULES 241
that sphere of state regulation and proposes a framework to facilitate
discerning such matters from other matters more easily preempted by
the Rules. Part IV.D then concludes by reconstructing the Shady
Grove decision through this new approach.
A. Congress’s Incomplete Delegation of Rulemaking Power
Since 1941, the Court has accepted the view that a Federal Rule
is valid under the REA so long as the Rule “really regulates proce-
dure,” in the sense that the Rule is targeted at some procedural aspect
of litigation.285 This understanding assumes that as long as a Rule is
procedural, it falls within the scope of the REA’s delegation of
rulemaking power, without regard to what state law it displaces. This
understanding implicitly assumes that Congress transferred the full
measure of its own constitutional power. It interprets the Court’s
rulemaking power as extending as far as Congress’s administrative
power over the organization of the federal courts. In other words, it
understands the REA as allowing the Court to engage in any rulemak-
ing that would fall within the scope of Congress’s own power. This
conclusion has no textual support in the REA itself. As many com-
mentators have observed, the delegation here was only partial, as the
REA limits the Court to promulgating only certain classes of Rules:
Rules that are not only procedural, but also refrain from impinging on
substantive rights.286
In contrast to the Court’s limited power under the REA, Congress
itself might conceivably use its power under Article III and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause to create procedural rules for the lower federal
courts in a manner that displaces both state and federal substantive
rights. Its legislative power is thus broader than the statutory delega-
285. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471;
see also Ely, supra note 19, at 719–20. This approach has been criticized for ignoring R
the second sentence of the REA’s limitation on the Rules, namely that they may not
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. Ely, supra note 19, at 718–19. R
However, others have argued there is a “strong presumption of validity” for the Fed-
eral Rules. Ides, Supreme Court, supra note 26, at 80–81. R
286. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 19, at 718–19; Whitten, supra note 5, at 127–28 R
(citing Ely, supra note 19, at 718–40). But see Burbank, REA, supra note 166, at R
1107–08 (reaching the conclusion that the second sentence served only to emphasize
the restriction established by the first sentence); Ides, Standard, supra 11, at 1063 R
(“§ 2072(b) is a congressional mandate that expressly limits the scope of the congres-
sional delegation of rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court.”). C.f. Clermont,
supra note 26, at 1006 (interpreting cases to mean that the ambiguous second sentence R
of the REA had “explanatory and emphatic roles” but was not an independent limit on
rulemaking).
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tion in the REA. This difference demonstrates that Congress delegated
less than the full measure of its full constitutional power.
It is therefore incorrect to argue that because Congress delegated
authority to the Court to promulgate national, uniform procedure, the
Rules always preempt state law to the contrary.287 The space for state
autonomy lies not in an area reserved by the Constitution to the states,
but in areas where the political and legislative processes have declined
to impose federal power.288 State autonomy thus inhabits not only ar-
eas Congress cannot reach under its Article I powers, but also areas it
can reach but has chosen to leave without federal legislation.
The correct question is not whether the state procedure falls in
some state enclave reserved by the Constitution to the states. Rather,
given the constitutional list of enumerated federal powers, has Con-
gress acted pursuant to one of those enumerated powers to intrude
legitimately into all the states’ domains the Rules might reach, or has
it chosen to leave some of those domains unaffected by federal power?
The incomplete delegation of congressional power to the Court in the
REA has bearing on the answer to these questions. At a minimum, it
suggests that Congress did not enact the REA with an express purpose
of altering the federalism balance with respect to the states’ police
powers.
Congress’s limitation regarding substantive rights in the REA
functionally reinforces “the constitutional perception that courts are
inappropriate makers of laws intruding upon states’ views of social
287. To the extent that the Court has long conflated the delegation of the power to
make procedural rules with the power to preempt state law in any area touched by
those rules, they are actually distinct questions and ought to be treated as such. But see
Clermont, supra note 26, at 1014 n.135 (discussing his disagreement with Professor R
Rowe’s position that “only a ‘politically accountable’ branch of the federal govern-
ment should be able to impinge on state substantive interests” and responding “that
the Court has in fact held that Congress already delegated the authority to adopt na-
tionwide procedure, even if we academics may dislike that holding”) (quoting Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr., Sonia, What’s a Nice Person Like You Doing in Company Like That?,
44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 107, 108 (2010) (observing that there is a “democratic deficit”
in the rulemaking process, as “no one officially involved in it ever, in his or her
capacity as a committee member or federal judge, faces any voters or reports to any-
one who does”)).
288. Professor Ely argued forcefully against the notion that the Constitution fences
off enclaves of exclusive state authority that might be protected from the Rules. Ely,
supra note 19, at 701–02. In his view, there are no exclusive areas of state control that R
cannot be reached by the Federal Rules pursuant to the Constitution. The lack of
constitutional text defining such enclaves, however, does not resolve whether the
Rules can intrude into areas of state concern. As discussed in Part III, areas of state
concern are also protected by political processes, even in areas Congress has the
power to regulate. Focusing on state enclaves overlooks this other category of legisla-
tively created autonomy.
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policy in areas of state competence.”289 Modern process federalism
arguments justify the importance of this limitation, even if they were
not its historical motivation.290 Thus, whatever the drafters’ intent in
1934, the substantive rights limitation reinforces the process-based
protection of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure where
Congress had not itself decided to override state policymaking choices
in particular areas. This leads to an inference that the REA may not be
a manifestation of Congress’s intent to use the Federal Rules to oust
the states from areas of traditional state policymaking, particularly the
expression of the states’ police powers and regulation of the general
welfare.
B. Presuming Congressional Intent to Preserve State Law in
Traditional Areas of State Regulation
Applying the federalism canons to the REA leads to a conclusion
that the Court’s rulemaking power is not broad enough to displace
state procedural rules that are part of a state regulatory scheme ad-
dressed to areas Congress has left to the states. The analysis com-
mences with a presumption that Congress did not intend for the Rules
to “imping[e] on important state interests,” including policymaking af-
fecting “the general welfare of society,” where that policymaking has
historically been a matter left by Congress to state regulation.291 As
non-preemption is the doctrinal default position, the absence of evi-
dence of intent to the contrary cuts against diversity preemption. To
rebut that presumption and conclude the REA conveyed the power to
make Rules that displace such state interests would require a showing
of a “clear and manifest” congressional purpose in the statute, under
the strong version of the canon,292 or some showing of congressional
intent, even if that were something less than unmistakable statutory
language, under the softer version of the canon.293 Both are absent.
289. Mishkin, supra note 8, 1686–87. R
290. E.g., id. at 1688. Process federalism generally invokes the political processes to
safeguard the diffusion of power in our federal system. See generally Ernest A.
Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001) (discuss-
ing the debate over whether the “protection of the state-federal balance should be left
to the political process” or whether there should also be judicial oversight).
291. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (internal citation
omitted).
292. Id.
293. Although the standard presumption against preemption can only be rebutted by
a showing of the “clear and manifest purpose” of Congress, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal citation omitted), this is different from the require-
ment of a clear statement in Gregory. The standard presumption may be rebutted not
only by the text (as would be true of a clear statement in Gregory), but also by impli-
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Given the absence of any consideration of state interests in the
original legislative history of the REA,294 there is nothing from which
one could infer that Congress intended for the Rules to displace state
laws in areas within the states’ historic police powers.295 In fact, Con-
gress could not possibly have weighed the potential preemption of
such state law in diversity cases in 1934, as the Supreme Court was
then still applying its own federal general common law to decide state
law questions.296 This history makes it impossible to view the REA as
signaling a deliberate intent to alter the federalism balance in such
traditional state areas. This conclusion is further buttressed by the
domination of the federal docket in the 1930s by federal question
cases,297 making it further unlikely that Congress would have any rea-
son to focus upon diversity preemption through this statute.
While the soft form of the canon provides a closer case due to the
general goal of procedural uniformity animating the REA, applying
either version of the federalism canon nevertheless leads to the same
conclusion because Congress never manifested intent to delegate
broad power to the rulemakers to displace state law in areas of tradi-
tional state autonomy. An obvious argument to rebut this conclusion
under the soft form of the federalism canon is that the original legisla-
tive goal of the REA was uniformity, so Congress must have meant to
displace any and all state law that impeded the creation of such uni-
form federal procedure. Although the text of the REA itself does not
expressly identify national uniformity as a goal, uniformity had been
the animating concern of the REA’s proponents for over a decade.298
To effectuate this goal, the Rules had to preempt contrary state laws in
diversity cases. Otherwise, there would be no uniform national proce-
dure in the federal courts. This would arguably satisfy the soft form of
cation based on the surrounding regulatory scheme or statutory framework, id. at
485–86, and the history of federal regulation in the field. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 565–66 (2009).
294. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. R
295. See Burbank, REA, supra note 166, at 1106 (“Nothing could be clearer from the R
pre-1934 history of the Rules Enabling Act than that the procedure/substance dichot-
omy in the first two sentences was intended to allocate lawmaking power between the
Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress. The pre-1934 history also makes clear
that the protection of state law was deemed a probable effect, rather than the purpose
of a limitation designed to allocate lawmaking power between federal institutions.”).
Professor Burbank’s historical research led him to conclude that proponents of the
REA “sought to demonstrate that the effect of the limitations on court rulemaking—
limitations that were formulated for another purpose—was to [safeguard state law],
unless Congress chose to legislate specifically in the area.” Id. at 1112.
296. See id. at 1109–10.
297. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 11, at 28. R
298. See Burbank, REA, supra note 166, at 1077–98. R
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the federalism canons, as the presumption against preemption could be
rebutted by showing that preemption is implicitly necessary to effectu-
ate the statutory structure or purpose.299 There are, however, difficul-
ties that emerge within this argument.
First, the REA’s structure does not mandate absolute uniformity,
only relative uniformity. By its own terms, it seems to expect some
disuniformity (i.e., when Rules abridge substantive rights, whether
state or federal).300 The goal of uniformity was always contingent
upon the quality of the rulemaking, with a built-in safety valve to
override uniformity under appropriate conditions. Second, the statu-
tory structure is capable of accepting significant deviation from uni-
formity in diversity cases. This is evident in the long list of cases in
which the Court declined to apply a seemingly on-point Rule in diver-
sity cases.301 Perhaps more importantly, one Rule may mean some-
thing different in a federal question case than it means in a diversity
case,302 which effectively splits a single rule into two distinct rules
depending on the source of subject matter jurisdiction.
The REA’s implementation has thus tolerated some disuniformity
in diversity cases for almost as long as the Rules have existed, and the
statute has survived intact. It thus seems impossible that preemption of
all state practices is necessary to effectuate the REA’s structure or
purpose. Finally, Rule 83, which authorizes district courts to adopt
their own local rules, enshrines additional disuniformity into the sys-
tem by creating a system of local rules that vary by district.303 Even in
the earliest days of the Rules, there was a perceived need to accommo-
date local customs.304 In the modern era, the disuniformity caused by
these local rules is significant.305 Accordingly, the general goal of uni-
299. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516–17 (1992).
300. See Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-
Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181,
1220–21 (2011) (discussing sources of disuniformity and concluding that “the goal of
uniformity has hardly been achieved across the board”).
301. See discussion supra Part I.A.2 (discussing Palmer, Ragan, and Cohen) and
Part I.B (discussing Walker and Gasperini).
302. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing West v. Conrail). R
303. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a).
304. David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal
Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 537, 537 (1985).
305. See id. at 538 (observing that in the mid-1980s, there were nearly 3,000 local
rules in the district courts); see also Samuel P. Jordan, Local Rules and the Limits of
Trans-Territorial Procedure, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 433 (2010) (observing
some local rules “impose substantial procedural requirements” such as “structur[ing]
the summary judgment process, including details relating to the form and nature of the
filings that must be submitted”); Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials,
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formity in the REA appears quite modest in this light and cannot bear
the weight of rebutting the presumption against preemption.
The REA’s displacement of traditional areas of state policymak-
ing fares even worse under the strong clear statement form of the ca-
nons.306 That version would require an express statement of
congressional intent in the text of the statute, which is plainly missing
here. One might respond that the strong version of the canon has no
place in this context. Gregory applied the clear statement rule in a
case involving state laws fundamental to the state’s own definition of
its qualifications for government officials, which presented an area of
special state concern.307 The structure of Justice O’Connor’s opinion
invokes the Tenth Amendment and a line of “political function” cases
to carve out special protection for state laws related to choosing gov-
ernment officials.308 To derive the clear statement rule, however, the
opinion cited none of that authority on the “specialness” of laws re-
lated to how states constitute their own government organization.
Rather, the derivation of this form of the clear statement rule came
from an Eleventh Amendment case, Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon,309 which in turn cited the classic case regarding the presump-
tion against preemption, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator.310 The opinion
goes so far as to conclude that the clear statement rule is “nothing
more than an acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sover-
eign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Con-
gress does not readily interfere.”311 Thus, the “specialness” of the
sovereignty issue in relation to the state’s own definition of its politi-
cal community did not appear to cause the Court to derive the clear
statement rule in the opinion’s structure; the Court first derived the
38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 832–33 (2011) (observing that local rules “may constrain
the ability of judges to make pretrial findings of fact in the manner of their
choosing”).
306. Although the standard presumption against preemption can only be rebutted by
a showing of the “clear and manifest purpose” of Congress, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996), this is different from the requirement of a clear statement in
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). The standard presumption may be rebutted
not only by the text (as would be true of a clear statement in Gregory), but also by
implication based on the surrounding regulatory scheme or statutory framework, id. at
487, and the history of federal regulation in the field, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
565 (2009).
307. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461–63.
308. Id. at 462–63.
309. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
310. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61.
311. Id. at 461.
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clear statement rule from a long line of cases in other contexts where
the state “retained substantial sovereign powers.”312
Moreover, whatever limitation one might discern from the unu-
sual facts of Gregory is undermined by the application of a strong
form of the canon in BFP,313 a case involving a mundane state prop-
erty foreclosure law.314 In fact, the Court in BFP expressly rejected
the dissent’s contention that Gregory was inapposite by emphasizing
that the state law at issue involved “the general welfare” (i.e., historic
police powers) and that the case involved “the essential sovereign in-
terest in the security and stability of title to land.”315
Some displacements of state law by the Federal Rules may in-
volve interests no less connected to the core political identity of the
state than the state law at issue in Gregory. The procedure mecha-
nisms in anti-SLAPP laws,316 for example, relate to states’ regulation
of the right to petition the state government, an interest as intimately
tied to the democratic identity of a political community as the employ-
ment qualification at issue in Gregory.317 Thus, even under a parsimo-
nious application of the strong version of the canon closely tracking
Gregory’s “special” circumstances, state interests can arise in proce-
dural contexts that merit its use in the “procedural Erie” context.
Alternatively, one might apply the so-called “presumed aware-
ness” canon to argue that because Congress has long acquiesced in the
Court’s broad construction of the REA, it should be deemed to have
approved that construction.318 The broad understanding of rulemaking
power has been in place since at least 1965 in Hanna, and was implied
in 1941 in Sibbach. Under this argument, since Congress did nothing
to rein in the application of the Rules, despite several amendments to
the REA,319 one could infer that Congress’s inaction demonstrates ap-
proval of the Court’s interpretation of the REA. In support of this
view, there is a canon of statutory construction providing that where
Congress uses terms with settled meanings based on case law, later
312. Id.
313. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
314. Id. at 534.
315. See id. at 544 & n.8.
316. See supra note 179 (explaining anti-SLAPP laws). R
317. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2012) (declaring that the
anti–SLAPP law’s purpose is “to encourage continued participation in matters of pub-
lic significance” and that “this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the
judicial process”).
318. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 185, at 75. R
319. See Struve, supra note 152, at 1105–09 (discussing amendments to the REA in R
1958 and 1988).
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courts should follow those settled meanings.320 Along the same lines,
when Congress re-enacts a statute, there is a presumption that the re-
enacted statute incorporates settled interpretations.321 There is thus an
argument that the 1988 amendment of the REA, which was post-
Hanna, incorporated whatever interpretations of the REA were on re-
cord and presumably known by Congress. Congress chose to continue
to use the same key words in defining the scope of the Court’s power.
It would follow that if Congress had disagreed with the Court’s broad
interpretation of the rulemaking power, it would have made its disa-
greement known.322
Congress actually did make such disagreement known. The 1985
Judiciary Committee Report on amending the REA expressly criti-
cized the Court’s Sibbach/Hanna interpretation of the REA.323 It
found that “there is no shared conception” of the limitations on the
delegation in the REA between Congress and the Court.324 The “pre-
sumed awareness” canon is thus undercut by legislative history from
the era of the 1988 reenactment.
Moreover, application of the “presumed awareness” canon re-
quires a settled, authoritative interpretation of the statute. In fact, the
Court has gone so far as to require that “the supposed judicial consen-
sus [be] so broad and unquestioned that [it] must presume Congress
knew of and endorsed it.”325 The meaning of the “substantive rights”
limitation in the REA has never been settled—it split the Court in
1941 in Sibbach, appeared to have been impliedly overruled by Guar-
anty Trust, was glossed over in Hanna, and fractured the Court again
in Shady Grove. Moreover, despite Hanna’s attempt to create a
bright-line doctrine favoring broad rulemaking authority, the Court
has been inconsistent in applying that doctrine, and Hanna’s rule was
riddled with incoherent exceptions from its very inception.326 In fact,
the legislative history leading up to the 1988 amendment shows con-
gressional awareness of this unsettled legal landscape, concluding that
“important questions about the extent and propriety of the delegation
320. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978) (“[W]here, as here, Con-
gress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can
be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated
law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.”).
321. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 185, at 75 (describing this canon of R
construction).
322. See id.
323. H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 13 & n.43, 20–21 (1985).
324. Id. at 21.
325. See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 349 (2005).
326. See supra Parts I.B and I.C (discussing the inconsistency of the Court’s inter-
pretation of its rulemaking power).
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of power to the courts to make supervisory rules” in the REA re-
mained answered.327 There was thus no settled or authoritative inter-
pretation of the REA against which Congress might have been
legislating when it amended the REA in 1988.
Congress’s failure to amend the REA to correct the Court’s ex-
pansive interpretation might signal an expectation that the Court will
eventually correct its own excesses, or simply an unwillingness to
confront the issue, or the result of pressure from interest groups.328 Or
it may signal a simple lack of awareness of the specific federalism
issues involved in the rulemaking process because Congress has never
considered them, which is precisely the point of the federalism
canons.
Nor is it an answer to argue that the Advisory Committee may
sufficiently consider state interests at the Rule-drafting stage. That
process seeks participation “by a broad segment of the community,”329
and the Advisory Committee may reconsider proposals based on the
criticism it receives.330 Thus, federalism objections by state officials
might affect the drafting of a proposed Rule, were state officials suffi-
ciently prescient to predict the collision between a proposed Rule and
state law in future litigation in diversity cases. Of course, the Advisory
Committee need not defer to state interests as part of this process. The
fifty states lack representation on the committee (though the standing
committee currently includes one state judge).331 The process has no
political safeguard to prevent the exercise of its considerable discre-
327. H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 7; see also id. at 12–14 (discussing “instances where
the Congress concluded that the Supreme Court had overstepped the bounds of its
rulemaking authority” in the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence, highlighting
problems with Advisory Committee proposals to amend Rule 68, recognizing as valid
criticism that “the proposals would violate the Enabling Act,” and noting the lack of
standards to distinguish between substance and procedure); id. at 22 (explaining that
the REA should be understood as “reserve[ing] to Congress decisions concerning pro-
spective federal regulation of matters peculiarly within its competence, having regard
to Congress’[s] representative nature and to its experience in prospective lawmaking
that variously affects its constituencies in their out-of-court affairs” and expecting that
Rules would be “refined” with these admonitions in mind).
328. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750 (2006) (plurality opinion).
This view is supported by the Judiciary Committee’s report from 1985. See H.R. REP.
NO. 99-422, at 22 (1985).
329. Struve, supra note 152, at 1126 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-422, at 26 (1985)). R
330. Id.
331. Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure Chairs and Reporters, U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Members_List_
Oct_2011.pdf (last updated June 12, 2012); see also A Summary for the Bench and
Bar, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/
RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx (last visited March 5, 2012) (“The
Standing Committee and the advisory committees are composed of federal judges,
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tion to push forward Rules that may have deleterious effects on state
policymaking. Even the most well-meaning committee might reasona-
bly be unaware of the effect of a proposed Rule on the laws of a state
in which the committee members have never practiced.
C. Proposed Alternative: Applying State Procedure in Areas
Connected to the Exercise of States’ Police Powers
Parts IV.A and IV.B demonstrate that the REA and structure of
the Rules do not reflect the manifestation of any congressional intent
for the Rules to alter the balance of federal and state power in areas
traditionally regulated by the states. This Part applies the federalism
canons to derive a new presumption in favor of state practices con-
nected to the state’s traditional areas of autonomy and offers an alter-
native test. It argues that federal courts should not apply a Federal
Rule to displace state law that is part of the state’s regulation of the
general welfare, or otherwise related to the exercise of the state’s po-
lice powers, in an area left by Congress to the states.
This article does not claim that Federal Rules should never apply
in diversity cases, or even that they usually do not apply. Most states
have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, greatly reducing
the incidence of conflicts in diversity cases.332 Where there are varia-
tions, this article is not concerned with preemption of ministerial state
choices—ranging from the number of interrogatories or peremptory
challenges permitted to the kinds of records kept by court clerks. This
article instead makes a narrower point: it focuses on a small body of
state laws that accomplish some regulatory goal in a traditional state
area Congress has chosen not to regulate. Historical examples include
areas as diverse as health and safety, property transfer and zoning,
insurance, domestic relations, probate, worker’s compensation, and
premises liability.333 These are significant areas where the federalism
balance has vested states with a primary role in regulating conduct
within their own borders. Congress could federalize many of those
practicing lawyers, law professors, state chief justices, and representatives of the De-
partment of Justice.”).
332. By 1986, thirty-three states had adopted the Federal Rules in full or part. John
B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 357
(2003) [hereinafter Oakley, Rules]. Indeed, the original drafters of the Federal Rules
hoped that the Rules would serve as a model for states to emulate. See Charles Allan
Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 86 (1959). However, in the
last decade, the Federal Rules’ influence on state procedure appears to have been
waning. See Oakley, Rules, supra, at 383–84.
333. See Sandi Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 HOUSTON L. REV. 1659, 1666
(2009).
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areas—and indeed in the twentieth century Congress did federalize
vast areas that had previously been primarily regulated by the
states.334 However, in areas where states are still the primary regula-
tors, the presumption against preemption has force.
The role of the state law being displaced in such a regulatory
scheme is of critical importance in the diversity preemption analysis.
The question of whether the state law bears a “procedural” or “sub-
stantive” label is in this sense beside the point. Under this view, even
if the “substantive rights” limit is surplusage (or descriptive, emphatic,
or otherwise something other than an additional limit beyond the re-
quirement that Rules be limited to “practice and procedure”), displac-
ing certain kinds of state laws is nevertheless to be avoided. The
federalism canons lead to a conclusion that where a Rule’s applica-
tion, based on its plain meaning, would displace state laws that are
connected to the state’s regulation of the general welfare, or are in an
area otherwise within the state’s police powers and left by Congress to
the states, federal courts should decline to use the Federal Rules to
preempt state law. The crucial consideration is whether the law is in
an area where Congress has declined to exercise federal power and the
state law at issue is part of the manner in which the state governs the
area. When a state’s practice is not part of its regulation in an area of
traditional state autonomy, applying the Federal Rule would be within
the scope of Congress’s delegation of rulemaking power. At that
point, the question of whether the Rule is “really procedural” or in
some way substantive matters. Given that areas within the states’ po-
lice powers implicate deeply rooted federalism concerns (and reflect
areas where the political safeguards of federalism in the legislative
process are especially vital), there should not be an especially high
burden required to connect state law to such a regulatory scheme. In
these areas of special state authority where Congress has left states as
the primary regulators, the Court should interpret the preemptive force
of its own rulemaking narrowly. This is not only because Congress
delegated less than the full constitutional measure of Congress’s own
power, but also because of the Court’s functional incompetence to
provide a forum for weighing state political interests in deciding pre-
emption questions. For these reasons, ambiguity in a state law’s pur-
pose generally should militate against applying the Federal Rules if it
334. See, e.g., Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause & the Myth of Dual
Federalism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847, 1915–17 (2007); see also Jason Scott Johnston,
The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of American Natural Re-
source Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 488 (2003).
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is at least reasonably likely that the state law actually functions as part
of such a special regulatory scheme.
To facilitate easy application of these principles, there should be
a presumption that the Federal Rules will yield where the state prac-
tice being displaced bears a discernible relationship to the effective
functioning of the state’s regulation. This presumption might be rebut-
ted through evidence of a different purpose in the state practice or the
lack of a sufficiently close connection between the state practice and
the regulatory purpose. The point, however, is that the state practice in
these special areas should be applied not only where it is “unmistaka-
bly clear” that the practice is integral to the state’s regulatory struc-
ture, but also where it seems reasonably likely that it is. Where a
rational state legislature likely used a given practice to accomplish
state regulatory interests in an area of special state autonomy, and the
practice is functioning to further that regulatory interest, the state prac-
tice should be followed.
This new presumption specifically targets areas where states are
primary regulators, and therefore may help solve the practical difficul-
ties that sometimes arise in ascertaining precisely what a state legisla-
ture intended when it enacted a practice without leaving behind clear
legislative history. Resolving doubt about whether Federal Rules have
impermissible effects on areas of state autonomy in favor of the states
makes such situations easier for lower courts to navigate.
This approach would reach results that are largely consistent with
proposals attempting to give force to the “substantive rights” limita-
tion, though it operates independently of the procedure-substance dis-
tinction. The test here is at once both broader and narrower than that
limitation. It is broader because it captures not only procedural rules
that are “bound up” with substantive rights, but also procedural rules
that regulate procedure qua procedure where doing so is part of the
way the state tackles a social problem related to the general welfare.335
It is also narrower in that it does not target all possible areas where
states may create substantive rights (which includes areas co-regulated
by the federal government, or even areas of primary federal control
where state regulation is secondary or supplemental), which fall
335. For example, the entire mechanism of state anti-SLAPP laws are typically pro-
cedure qua procedure, in that the law creates special procedural techniques to extricate
defendants quickly and cheaply from suits that would chill protected speech or peti-
tioning the government, and litigation itself is in need of regulation in the eyes of the
Legislature. Such laws typically have no companion substantive provision (e.g., there
is no substantive change to defamation or liable law). See supra note 179 and accom- R
panying text (discussing the example of anti-SLAPP procedures).
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outside areas of traditional state autonomy. Rather, this approach fo-
cuses its protective power exclusively on regulatory areas Congress
has left to the states to act as primary governing entities.
One possible criticism of this new approach lies in the past diffi-
culty the Court has had in assessing what matters fall within the his-
toric police powers of the states in other areas of law. For example, in
interpreting the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause, the Court held in National League of Cities v. Usery that Con-
gress lacks the power under the Commerce Clause to enforce certain
kinds of legislative commands against the States “in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions.”336 Nine years later in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the Court reconsid-
ered the issue because federal and state courts struggled to separate
traditional functions from nontraditional ones.337 The Court concluded
that its test relying on “traditional governmental functions” was un-
workable and overruled National League of Cities.338
This might appear to suggest that trying to parse procedural rules
based on the state’s historic police powers or traditional areas of state
regulation would be similarly unworkable. But such a conclusion is
not warranted by Garcia. Garcia involved the application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to a municipal transit agency. Congress
had already specifically made the FLSA applicable to state and local
employees and public mass-transit carriers.339 Under the old National
League of Cities rule, a state employer could be immunized from hav-
ing to obey the federal legislation if the legislation impaired its “‘abil-
ity to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.’”340 This required the Court to embark on a philosophical
inquiry into the political roles states had historically played in the field
of transportation and what modern circumstances entailed.341 The
Court concluded that it lacked the ability “to specify precisely what
aspects of a governmental function made the function necessary to the
‘unimpaired existence’ of the States.”342
This is not the same inquiry the Court has applied to protect
traditional areas of state regulation using the federalism canons. For
336. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
337. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 533.
340. Id. at 537 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
341. Id. at 538–40.
342. Id. at 541 (internal citation omitted).
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example, the problems identified by the Court in Garcia in 1985
posed no obstacle in Gregory or BFP in the 1990s. Nor did they pose
problems in more recent cases applying the presumption against pre-
emption. For example, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Court recently observed
one of the “touchstones” guiding preemption questions in areas states
have traditionally occupied: “[W]e ‘start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.’”343
The preemption inquiry into police powers is more concrete than
the one at issue in National League of Cities or Garcia in that it sim-
ply looks at whether the field is one the state has been left to regulate
without federal interference, and whether the field affects the general
welfare in that it implicates the manner in which the state preserves
the security and well-being of its citizens. Factors that might guide a
court in assessing whether the state’s policy goals fall within areas that
might trigger the protection of the federalism canons include: (1)
whether Congress has subjected the area of policymaking to federal
control,344 (2) whether the state is using a regulation to solve a broader
social problem, or, by contrast, (3) whether the state practice is a his-
torical fortuity resulting from inaction in a field the state has not ac-
tively tried to regulate.
This approach would allow federal courts to look at how state
law functions in a regulatory scheme to assess whether it is an exer-
cise of historic police power.345 This is a different approach from the
one proposed by Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Gasper-
343. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
344. E.g., id. at 566–67 (recounting the history of congressional control of drugs and
drug labeling).
345. Sergio Campos has observed that excavating policy justifications for procedural
state rules may sometimes be unreliable, due to defects in the state’s legislative pro-
cess or political maneuvering. See Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Choice of Enforcement
Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1573, 1618-19 (2012). He argues that states should be
forced to reveal substantive justifications for procedural rules or suffer a “penalty” of
having the Federal Rule preempt the state rule in diversity cases. Id. at 1627. He
would allow states to escape such preemption by tracking the language of the REA,
but allow Congress to express countervailing considerations through legislation that
might trigger broader preemption. Id. at 1628–29. Campos’s argument seeks to under-
stand Erie in this context as a problem of default rules, and his argument fits within
the REA’s “substantive rights” structure. His approach appears to substitute a differ-
ent set of default rules for the presumption against preemption, where the default rule
is already clear (and avoids preemption absent clear congressional intent to the con-
trary). Campos’s approach is arguably consistent with the presumption against pre-
emption, however, insofar as it places a burden on Congress to express countervailing
considerations triggering preemption.
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ini and from the dissent in Shady Grove. Justice Ginsburg’s method of
safeguarding federalism was to weigh “important” state interests as a
means of interpreting the Rules to try to avoid conflict with those state
interests, changing the meaning of the Rules to reach the desired re-
sult.346 Neither the majority opinion in Gasperini nor the dissent in
Shady Grove offered guidance on what constitutes an “important”
state policy, opening Justice Ginsburg’s approach to the criticism that
it was “standardless.”
By contrast, the Court’s method in its preemption cases for clas-
sifying “important” state interests is not standardless. It is a standard
that the Court has been applying with regularity since the time of the
Framing through the modern era to identify the internal power of
states to regulate matters within their borders to promote the general
welfare of their citizens.347 Looking to whether state laws fall into
states’ police powers separates state laws deserving of the strongest
caution in the preemption analysis from those that may be more easily
preempted. Focusing on the preemption analysis also leaves the Rules’
plain meaning unaffected. The Rules either displace state law or they
do not.
Preemption analysis requires an examination of what is being
preempted. Even concluding that Congress intended to occupy the
field in a particular area would still require a look at the state statute at
issue to determine whether it actually falls in the same field occupied
by Congress.348 Contrary to the suggestion of the majority in Shady
Grove, such analysis would not necessarily require delving into the
subjective intentions of state legislators to divine whether they had a
substantive purpose in mind, thereby condemning hapless federal
judges to the menial task of “poring through state legislative history—
which may be less easily obtained, less thorough, and less familiar
346. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1460 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would continue to interpret Federal Rules
with awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state regulatory policies.”).
347. Historically, the police power referred to undefined powers reserved to the
states. See Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 783 & n.214 (2007). It eventually evolved to focus broadly
upon the regulation of public health, morals and safety, id. at 789–90, then expanded
to encompass “all the great public needs,” including public convenience and the gen-
eral prosperity. Id. at 793. The Court has applied the “police power” standard to ex-
amples as diverse as the inspection and quarantine of goods, removal of gunpowder,
regulation of public laundries, manufacturing and sale of liquor, setting milk prices,
mortgage regulations, eminent domain, and taxation. Id. at 784–94.
348. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 271 (2006) (discussing Oregon’s
physician-assisted suicide law and comparing it to the function of the federal Con-
trolled Substances Act).
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than its federal counterpart.”349 Judges can discern how procedural
rules fit into the state’s regulatory framework, and most importantly,
what reasonable legislators would expect it to accomplish. There is
nothing mystical, cryptic or even unusual about such a project. The
drafters can generally be presumed to have intended whatever effects
the statute has.
No Supreme Court decision involving the REA has ever applied
any federalism canon in a “procedural Erie” case. Justice Stevens
came close in his concurrence in Shady Grove, describing this pre-
sumption as “counsel[ing] against judicially created rules displacing
state substantive law.”350 The reference seemed to imply the presump-
tion applied to interpreting the Federal Rules themselves. Similarly,
one commentator has suggested looking at whether the Rule drafters
on the Advisory Committee “intended a particular Federal Rule ‘to
occupy the field’ and whether accommodating state law would
‘stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
[Rule drafters’] full purposes and objectives.’”351 However, the feder-
alism canons’ logical force applies to congressional legislation. They
serve to ensure that Congress has actually considered the effect of the
legislation in displacing state laws in important areas historically left
to the states. Their theoretical justification is deeply rooted in the po-
litical safeguards of federalism. Applying the canons to the rulemak-
ing process, where these safeguards do not exist, unhinges these
substantive canons from their reason for being.
Moreover, if the conclusion is correct that Congress did not dele-
gate the power to displace certain classes of state laws in areas tradi-
tionally regulated by the states, the intent of the Rules Advisory
Committee to dislocate state law has no bearing on the diversity pre-
emption question. The Advisory Committee cannot choose to preempt
that which Congress has chosen to leave in place. Nor is the Commit-
tee’s will to occupy a field and displace any and all state law a cure for
349. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1441. Asking federal courts to analyze state legal
sources that may be unfamiliar is the essence of diversity jurisdiction. The majority’s
argument is thus as much an argument against diversity jurisdiction as it is against
trying to research state law. Fortunately, forty-eight states have enacted laws permit-
ting federal courts to certify novel questions to the state’s highest court. See 17A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, & VIKRAM
DAVID AMAR, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION § 4248 n. 30 (3d ed.
2008 & 2010 Supp.) (collecting citations to state statutes authorizing procedures for
certification).
350. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 (Stevens, J., concurring).
351. Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling
Act after Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1171 (2011) (discussing Rule
23).
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the nonfunctioning of the states’ constitutional political safeguards at
the legislative level.352 Understood as an expression of these political
safeguards, the canons offer no interpretive model to apply to the
Rules or the rulemaking process.
D. Reconstructing Shady Grove Through the Federalism Canons
Applying this proposed approach to the facts of Shady Grove
would have taken the Court’s analysis in a different direction. The
analysis would begin not with the text of Rule 23, but with the appli-
cation of any Federal Rule to displace New York’s statute, which for-
bids maintaining a class action “to recover a penalty, or minimum
measure of recovery created or imposed by statute,” absent a specific
statutory exception.353
Even without any legislative history, prohibiting class actions in
areas of statutory penalties obviously functions to set the magnitude of
financial punishment in the state’s regulatory scheme.354 The insur-
ance penalty statute encourages insurance companies to pay quickly
through a small penalty. In enacting this statute, the state legislature
chose a low level of punishment. In the judgment of the New York
Legislature, this potential sanction is proportional to the business error
that caused it.355 This is a policy choice: the state could have decided
that prompt payment was so important that it would burden insurance
companies with large penalties (perhaps even including punitive dam-
ages), creating claims of tortious bad faith for third parties (like doc-
tors) to bring for unreasonably late payments. However, harsh penalty
schemes may increase the administrative expenses of insurance com-
352. Confusion regarding the effect of the federalism presumptions upon the mean-
ing of Rules themselves appears to flow from an erroneous theoretical assumption that
the Rules themselves have the same status as statutes—an idea that Justice Frankfurter
argued against in Sibbach. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (“Plainly the Rules are not acts of Congress and can not be
treated as such.”).
353. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (MCKINNEY 2006) (“Unless a statute creating or imposing
a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery
thereof in a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of
recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.”).
354. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 11, at 70 (discussing concerns in New York R
that “aggregation of penalties would lead to gross and destructive overenforcement”)
(quoting Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007)); id. at 72
(observing another court had also read this New York law as “defin[ing] the scope of
penalty liability . . . not merely the mechanisms available to enforce an aggregate
proceeding”).
355. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing
the legislative history of the New York statute).
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panies and produce higher insurance premiums,356 or drive carriers
from the state, making insurance products less available and less
affordable.
Limiting the magnitude of statutory late-payment penalties re-
flects a decision about New York’s regulation of its own insurance
industry. This may be good or bad policy, and, indeed, one could rea-
sonably take issue with the unlikelihood that anyone would ever sue to
recover a $500 penalty. The point, though, is that it was New York’s
policy choice, and it falls squarely under New York’s police powers,
in an area traditionally left by Congress to the states to regulate. It is
irrelevant whether there is a reasonable debate about the substantive
merit of such a policy choice. It is a matter Congress left to the wis-
dom of the democratically elected lawmakers of the State of New
York. Thus, the federalism canons protect New York’s law from pre-
emption in the absence of congressional intent to use the Rules to
federalize state insurance regulations. In this instance, Rule 23 should
have yielded to the state law.
The federalism canons offer a relatively clear path through the
tangled thicket of Shady Grove. Given that the Court has no power
under the Enabling Act to use the Rules to undermine state policymak-
ing in areas left by Congress to the states that fall within the states’
historic police powers, New York’s law should not have been pre-
empted. New York’s law falls squarely within its police power to reg-
ulate the general welfare, and thus should have prevailed over Rule 23
in a diversity case heard in federal court, even though New York’s
mode of regulation might conflict with Rule 23.
Were the matter not within New York’s police powers (such as
an area Congress co-regulated with the states), this article’s frame-
work would suggest a different answer: there would be no presump-
tion against preemption, and the matter would be open for debate as to
whether it falls under the REA’s “substantive rights” prohibition. Ap-
plying this article’s framework, however, avoids that difficult inquiry
356. The manner in which the state organizes the availability and magnitude of pen-
alties against insurers has the potential to affect statewide insurance premiums, and
that in turn affects the availability of insurance generally—and the general welfare.
See, e.g., ANGELA HAWKEN, STEPHEN J. CARROLL, & ALLAN F. ABRAHAMSE, RAND
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH DOCTRINE ON
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COSTS AND COMPENSATION 52–53 (2001), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1199.pdf (analyzing the effect
of California’s former policy of allowing third parties to bring tortious “bad faith”
claims to recover punitive damages against an insurer and concluding it caused a
substantial increase in automobile insurance premiums in California during the period
that this rule was in effect).
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into whether New York’s law affects substantive rights, to the extent it
results in a conclusion that New York’s law falls within that state’s
historic police powers.
CONCLUSION
Shady Grove threatens a wide array of state laws that regulate
areas within the states’ police powers. Indeed, any targeted calibration
of tort liability using procedural mechanisms may be swept aside by a
Federal Rule to the contrary. This puts the Court and the Advisory
Committee in the position of being able to dictate to the states what
kind of legislation states may use to regulate matters traditionally
within the states’ own sphere of competence, even in areas Congress
has chosen to leave to the states as primary regulators.
The Court has much work ahead of it to untangle the confusing
web left by the constellation of fractured opinions in Shady Grove.
Left uncorrected, this judicial usurpation has the potential to do great
harm to “Our Federalism.” It will likely usher in a new era of forum
shopping, as parties seek to take advantage of the federal forum to
avoid state laws in diversity cases. The inconsistency of results be-
tween state and federal courts that troubled the Court in the era before
Erie will again be part of the fabric of diversity suits. After nearly
eight decades, Shady Grove returns us to a point strangely similar to
the one where we started this long and winding journey in the era
before Erie.
Returning to the values underlying the modern understanding of
Erie and its commitment to principles of judicial restraint restores a
federalism balance that leaves to Congress the role of assigning how
much regulatory control to relinquish to states in areas within the
scope of congressional power. It avoids allowing procedural rulemak-
ing to become a back-door means of making substantive policy for the
states in areas left by Congress to the states.
Like a tail wagging the dog, giving the Rules broad preemptive
force in areas within the states’ historic police powers gives the Rules
more power than they deserve. By contrast, the framework offered in
this article has the benefit of limiting the Rules’ application to areas
where they properly belong.
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